

White Paper

Determining the Roles for General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Security Force Assistance (SFA) Missions and Refining a Process for Identifying the Best Force for Specific SFA Missions

“...arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is *not* the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. **The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police –once the province of Special Forces –is now a key mission for the military as a whole.**”

—Secretary Of Defense Robert Gates (10 Oct 07)

Introduction

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Building Partner Capacity (BPC) Roadmap problem statement provides the basis for this white paper: *“The nation’s strategic objectives are unattainable without a unified approach among capable partners at home and with key friends and allies abroad. Effectively integrating DOD’s contribution with those of other instruments of national power, as well as with international partners, was a central theme of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Department of Defense requires a long-term, focused approach to build the capacity and capability of its mission-critical partnerships. Executing the BPC Roadmap tasks is the way the Department will generate increased partnership capacity for its high priority missions.”*

Purpose and Specific Problem Statement

The purpose of this paper is two fold. First, to establish a common understanding of DOD’s role in Security Force Assistance (SFA), or Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) missions. Second, to address a specific problem statement: *How does the DOD determine force mix of GPF and SOF capabilities and capacities to effectively conduct SFA?* This paper provides a foundation for all force providers to identify the best possible force mix of General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) for SFA missions. TAA is also often referred to as Security Force Assistance (SFA), so for clarity only the term SFA will be used. The elements of TAA are articulated in Joint and Service foreign internal defense (FID) doctrine, therefore this paper also recommends the SFA definition provided below be proposed as a standard one for use to subsume all TAA mission areas described herein. An encapsulation of each element: Train, Advise, and Assist, are also offered for additional clarity. With regard to processes, this paper borrows heavily from several existing ones to assist in making these determinations. Unlike SFA for ongoing operations in OIF and OEF-A, SFA missions in this discussion generally will be addressed as a steady state or “Phase 0 activity,” the most likely phase for initiating a SFA mission. Finally, although this paper limits its scope to DOD efforts within the larger US Government (USG), it must be acknowledged

48 several key allies of the US, including the UK, Australia, and Canada, have significant
49 roles to play and bring unique capabilities and access to bear in complementary SFA
50 efforts.

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52 **Key Imperatives**

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54 There are two key imperatives that must be articulated prior to a discussion of the
55 issue:

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57 1. The necessity to ensure the forces of both GPF and SOF are preserved for all missions
58 that span the range of military operations, to include the Long War.

59

60 2. SFA efforts must be resourced for an appropriately consistent engagement, in
61 accordance with stated long-term U.S. objectives, with the host nation. Consistent
62 engagement may not necessarily involve prolonged “boots on ground” time, but may
63 reflect more of a persistent presence without permanence.

64

65 This approach is not currently feasible everywhere, but it is anticipated with the
66 eventual draw down in OIF or OEF-A, this imperative can be better supported. The same
67 SFA unit, group, or regionally specialized “plug and play” personnel should be used with
68 the host nation counterpart where possible to establish and build rapport, maintain
69 continuity, monitor their progress over time, and establish solid relationships.

70 Ultimately, personnel management systems might even make it possible to align officers
71 and NCOs with their host nation counterparts in Service and Joint schools and
72 professional military education programs to enhance ongoing relationships. Efforts
73 should be made to have mutual complementary efforts between SFA actions and service
74 international affairs or International Programs Offices (IPO) that handle issues such as
75 Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International
76 Military Education and Training (IMET).

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78 **A Common Lexicon**

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80 To have a productive discussion on these issues requires a common understanding
81 of the terms and concepts associated with them. A series of key terms and concepts
82 consistently appear when discussing SFA missions. The following definitions (with
83 source) are given to provide a starting point for discussions leading to the goals of this
84 paper (portions relevant to the DOD *italicized*).

85

86 Irregular Warfare (IW): A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for
87 legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors *indirect*
88 and asymmetric *approaches*, though it may employ the *full range of military and other*
89 *capabilities*, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (JP 1-02)

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91 Building Partnership Capacity (BPC): 1. Targeted efforts to improve the collective
92 capabilities and performance of the DOD and its partners (e.g. USG agencies; private
93 sector; NGOs; *allies, coalition members, host nations*). (QDR Execution Roadmap:

94 Building Partnership Capacity) 2. Ability to set conditions for interaction with partner,
95 competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing
96 and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will,
97 behavior, and capabilities. (Joint Capability Area Tier 1)

98
99 Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Participation by civilian and *military agencies* of a
100 government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other
101 designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and
102 insurgency. (JP 3-07.1) US military support to FID should focus on the operational
103 assistance to HN personnel and collaborative planning with other government agencies
104 (OGAs), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Organizations
105 (NGOs), and Host Nation (HN) authorities to anticipate, preclude, and counter these
106 threats. (JP 3-0)

107
108 Security Cooperation (SC): All *DOD interactions* with foreign defense establishments to
109 *build defense relationships* that promote specific US security interests, *develop allied and*
110 *friendly military capabilities* for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide
111 US forces with *peacetime and contingency access* to a host nation. (JP 3-07.1)

112
113 Security Assistance (SA): Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act
114 of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other
115 related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training,
116 and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of
117 national policies and objectives. A principal instrument in the U.S. FID effort. Like FID
118 itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes *efforts of* civilian agencies as well
119 as those of *the military*. SA, while integral to our FID program, is also much broader
120 than FID alone. (JP 3-07.1)

121
122 Security Force Assistance (SFA): (**recommended term for use in discussion**). Unified
123 action to generate, employ and sustain local Host Nation or regional security forces in
124 support of a legitimate authority. (Joint Center for International Security Force
125 Assistance (JCISFA)) This covers all applications of organizing, training, equipping,
126 rebuilding, and advising foreign security forces supporting legitimate authorities
127 regardless of the threats, threat levels and national, regional, or multinational orientations.

128
129 Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA): Whereas a singular definition for TAA does not exist,
130 Joint and Service internal defense doctrine articulates the complexities of each element.
131 An encapsulation of each element is:

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133 Train: To teach, through instruction and practice, members and *units of military*
134 and security forces the skills necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. Most often
135 this will be a doctrinal or procedural foundation for military operations and activities.

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137 Advise: To provide advice, counsel, mentoring, and support to *partner military*
138 and security personnel or units undergoing final training or in transition to conducting
139 operations or those already conducting operations. Most often it involves the practical

140 application of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to a situation-specific
 141 context.


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 143 Assist: To provide equipment, materiel, logistics, or other military support to
 144 *partner military* and security forces to support or sustain their capacity to accomplish
 145 their assigned missions. Assistance by DOD is given through programs under both
 146 Department of State and DOD authority.

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 148 Additional efforts by USSOCOM with coordination with services, will formalize
 149 the definition for TAA activities.

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 151 **Scoping DOD’s Role in Steady State SFA**

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 153 To further define and scope the SFA concept, it is important to delineate DOD’s
 154 role with respect to other USG efforts within a given country. As illustrated in Diagram
 155 1, there generally are three areas of SFA interaction: the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and
 156 Ministry of (Public) Information (if
 157 extant); the Ministry of the Interior,
 158 Justice, Customs, Intelligence
 159 Services, etc; and Local Security or
 160 Police (columns). Within each area,
 161 four levels of SFA exist, starting
 162 with Ministry Advisor, followed by
 163 Service Advisor, Combat Advisor,
 164 and finally Tactical Trainer (rows).

165 Core DOD capability with
 166 the DOD as the lead in conducting
 167 SFA generally occurs within the
 168 MOD. In this area, the DOD should
 169 cover all four levels of SFA. In the
 170 remaining areas: Ministry of Interior
 171 or Intelligence Services and Local Security (Police)¹, DOD may augment the lead federal
 172 agencies with key capabilities at the Tactical Trainer level and, in the case of the Ministry
 173 of Interior or Intelligence Services, at the Combat Advisor level. In the event of a surge,
 174 however, DOD may serve as Ministry or Service Advisors at the Ministry of Interior or
 175 Intelligence Services and the Local Security (Police), and as a Combat Advisor at the
 176 Local Security (Police).



177 **Diagram 1, DOD’s role in Steady State SFA**

177 Within a particular country, SFA can be seen at one of three levels of support.
 178 The first is institution building, which requires the highest level of support. Iraq, in its
 179 current state, is an example of level one. The second level of support is capacity
 180 building. This is typically done when institutions are in place and therefore is generally
 181 less support-intensive. The third level is partnership building and maintaining. This is
 182 the least support-intensive and may be driven by access constraints at well.

¹ When granted the appropriate authorities

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184 **DOD SFA Capabilities Continuum**

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The range of DOD capabilities with respect to SFA may be best described as a continuum ranging from General Purpose Forces capabilities (left) to Special Operations Forces-unique capabilities (right) and across all phases of conflict, as illustrated in Diagram 2. The determination of the best force(s) to fulfill specific SFA missions in the area of overlap denotes the critical challenge of this paper.



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At the extreme left are mission areas which are well-suited for GPF and which may be conducted without any SOF involvement or support. These can be termed *GPF-appropriate*.² However, in some circumstances, even *GPF-appropriate* tasks may be conducted by SOF. This could be to allow SOF access to a key country or region. These would then be called *SOF-appropriate* in that while they are not SOF-specific missions, they are most appropriately conducted by SOF.

Diagram 2, the DOD TAA Mission Continuum

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There are also instances where the mission makes the selection of forces relatively simple. If a host nation is requesting assistance in establishing core processes for building a ground force as an institution, to include doctrine, organization, training, logistics and materiel, in most cases this constitutes a mission most appropriate for GPF. The Georgia Train and Equip Program is an example of this. Conversely, a request to establish a special operations organization similar to USSOCOM or component of a partner military would constitute a mission most appropriate for SOF on the other end of the continuum. OEF-Philippines is an example of this type of mission.

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Other SFA missions that fall at the opposite end of the continuum, however, require SOF-unique capabilities, specialized training and/or equipment which are typically not found in the GPF. These are part of the SOF core tasks³ and therefore are most appropriate for SOF. Examples of these include Counter-Proliferation (CP) and Unconventional Warfare (UW). As such, these activities typically remain the domain of SOF. However, as with the GPF-appropriate tasks in some circumstances being executed by SOF, the opposite can be true as well. That is, in some circumstances, some SOF tasks may be conducted by GPF.

² Examples of *GPF-appropriate* tasks beyond basic combat skills include military planning, basic and advanced leadership skills, horizontal and vertical construction, water purification, sustainment operations, field sanitation, military policing, explosive ordnance disposal, maintenance operations, and Brigade Combat Team Trauma Training (for surgeons and physician's assistants).

³ SOF Core Tasks: Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), Counterterrorism (CT), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Civil Affairs (CA) Operations, Information and Psychological Operations (IO and PSYOP), and Synchronize DOD Efforts in the GWOT.

220 Within the area of overlap, some SFA missions have the potential to be conducted
221 or supported by either GPF or SOF, or some combination of both. Several variations
222 along the continuum can be envisioned, and in some cases, have already been executed.
223 One variation is to start SFA with SOF, and at some point transition to a GPF lead. The
224 Republic of Georgia Train and Equip Program experience seems to validate this
225 variation. In this case, SOF conducted the start-up and initial SFA missions and then
226 handed the mission off to the GPF. Another could be GPF developing the basic skills
227 and then handing off aspects to SOF at some point in the development of the unit. Yet
228 another could be a dual role in which SOF trains and advises portions of the force in the
229 most *SOF-appropriate* areas while the GPF trains and advises other, more general forces
230 simultaneously in the more *GPF-appropriate* areas. An example of this is OEF-Trans
231 Sahara.

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233 Given the limited number of SOF and GPF available, coupled with high
234 OPTEMPO and Combatant Commander demand for SFA, the joint force providers—
235 Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for conventional forces and SOCOM for special
236 operations forces—should match the most appropriate capability, GPF or SOF, with the
237 Combatant Commander requirement and synchronize those requirements against
238 Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation events, exercises and existing
239 operational plans. This will effectively and efficiently focus limited assets on building
240 partner capacity of host nations and developing indigenous armies and police units.

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242 The determination of the best force composition, however, cannot be made in the
243 abstract. Each SFA mission must be reviewed and analyzed within the context of the
244 larger system and geo-political situation in which it exists to formulate the best possible
245 force, or force mix, to accomplish it. The goal is to deliver to the combatant commander
246 a force whose core competencies and level of training provide the required capability to
247 sustain or improve desired persistent effects by building partner capabilities and
248 capacities.

249 250 251 **Analyzing the SFA Mission**

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253 Each SFA mission should undergo a rigorous screening process led initially by
254 the Geographic Combatant Command to determine whether the mission should be
255 undertaken at all. These criteria should be collaboratively developed by the Force
256 Providers (GPF and SOF), OSD (P), Joint Staff J3, GCC, and the Department of State
257 (typically through the country team), informed by the intelligence community, and
258 provide the needed analytical rigor to make the best possible decision on whether an SFA
259 mission should be undertaken and if so, determining the best force/force mix for it.

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261 Questions such as “Why is this SFA mission being requested?” “To what end are
262 we conducting the SFA mission?” and “What is the long-term US and Office of the
263 Secretary of Defense (OSD) strategy related to this country?” must be considered in
264 determining if the SFA mission is even appropriate and meets the outline.
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266 Other factors to consider in establishing the context of a particular SFA mission
267 involve host country and the purpose of the engagement. These factors include: “Is the
268 overall intent of the effort to operate *with* the force being trained (like Iraq), or it is to
269 operate *alongside* that force (like NATO)?” and “Is the intent to enable the force to be
270 trained to protect its own sovereignty or is it to prepare the force for a specific mission of
271 particular interest?” Answers to these questions will begin to illuminate the best solution.
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273 Once a SFA mission successfully passes the screening and context analysis phase,
274 it should undergo a force assignment phase of evaluation and analysis based on
275 Combatant Commander priorities and host nation metrics to determine the best fit.
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277 Combatant Commanders will set their own priorities, so this paper will focus on
278 shaping the host nation metrics. It can be argued, especially in the wake of post-9/11
279 warfare, that many general purpose forces have the experience, capability, depth, and
280 training to conduct some of the range of SFA missions traditionally executed by SOF. It
281 is only prudent that OSD leverage this added conventional force functionality, where
282 practicable, to satisfy Combatant Commander requirements.
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284 A proposed starting point for possible criteria follows:
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- 286 • Political Acceptability: The political and diplomatic landscape may serve as the
287 first and most important consideration in SFA missions. Determining the degree
288 of willingness of political leaders to support the introduction of U.S. military
289 forces will help determine the appropriate force for the mission. Additionally, the
290 leaders of host nations may desire a specific force, which must also be considered.
 - 291 ○ What level of visibility is called for in the mission (high, medium, or low
292 profile/degree of media/public scrutiny)?
 - 293 ○ What level of risk (high, medium, or low) is associated with the mission?
 - 294 ○ Is the country friendly, belligerent, or non-belligerent? To what degree is
295 the country willing/unwilling and able/unable to fight terrorism or pursue
296 common security objectives?
 - 297 ○ Is the host nation specifically requesting a certain type of force (GPF or
298 SOF) to conduct the mission?
 - 299 ○ Does the potential political situation, host nation acceptance, US strategic
300 interests necessitate the GPF larger capabilities, presence, and additional
301 resources?
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- 303 • Access: Gaining access to various nations or the regions they occupy is a primary
304 consideration. In some cases, other considerations in this list may prevent US
305 forces being introduced directly where they need to be, yet gaining access through
306 SFA missions in neighboring host nations may be feasible.
 - 307 ○ Is there a need to gain access to the region, host nation, or sub-region by
308 the USG, DOD, or SOF?
 - 309 ○ Is the sub-region or area of operations governed, under-governed, or
310 ungoverned?

- 311 ○ Is the country, sub-region, or operational area hostile, uncertain, or
 312 permissive?
 313 ○ What is the state of the host nation infrastructure nationally and within the
 314 specific operational area?
 315
- 316 • Specialized Forces, Equipment, or Skills: Certain SFA missions may have
 317 requirements that will lead to a specific choice for the skilled force with the
 318 proper equipment. This does not imply a default choice for SOF, because there
 319 are skills and equipment resident in GPF units that may be more appropriate to the
 320 mission. Additionally, the duration of the mission may determine a specialized
 321 force with the appropriate time available to support it.
 - 322 ○ Does the mission require execution immediately, within weeks, or within
 323 months/years?
 - 324 ○ Does the mission require specialized skills, language training, or cultural
 325 sensitivity? Are those skills resident in the GPF or only available from
 326 SOF?
 - 327 ○ Does the mission require specialized equipment resident in the GPF or
 328 only in SOF?
 - 329 ○ Is the length of the mission weeks, months, or years?
 - 330 ○ Does the mission call for a small, medium, or large footprint?

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332 A crucial factor, not previously mentioned, is an assessment of the host nation
 333 forces to be trained. In many cases, basic military principles, discipline, and
 334 capabilities are lacking. Although SOF possesses the training and institutional
 335 experience in developing such forces into a professional organization, it may be
 336 expedient to first provide basic military skills, which can be accomplished by GPF.
 337 From there, SOF can capitalize on this foundation and provide additional training in
 338 the form of counter-terrorism, special reconnaissance, or other SOF-specific missions
 339 that develop a partner counter-terrorism capability. Other key considerations are
 340 whether or not there is the potential for a SOF follow-on mission to the SFA mission
 341 and whether or not the mission takes place in a GWOT high priority or priority
 342 country. Answers to these questions, coupled with the analysis of the above criteria,
 343 should lead to a well-informed decision on force assignment as graphically depicted
 344 in Diagram 3.
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


Diagram 3, Proposed Decision Flowchart (draft)

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The Proponent of SFA should be designated as the lead Joint Force Provider of Joint Staff validated SFA requirements. The lead Joint Force Provider should also be responsible for developing and implementing a process, in collaboration with the Joint Staff, JFCOM, Services and Combatant Commands, which will determine the best sourcing solutions to ensure the combatant commanders requirements are met. This process will most likely be based on the current Global Force Management Board (GFMB) Business Rules in lieu of forming an entirely new process.

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The Geographic Combatant Commands will identify and submit their requirements to the Joint Staff for validation, designating whether the requirement is supporting a SFA mission or not. Upon validation, all SFA requirements will be forwarded to the lead Joint Force Provider (SFA Proponent) for analysis of whether the requirement would be best sourced by SOF, GPF, or a combination of both SOF and GPF as previously discussed in this paper. This process to determine a sourcing solution should be both transparent and worked in concert with the Services, USSOCOM, Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff.

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The lead Joint Force Provider will forward all SOF requirements to USSOCOM as the Force Provider for SOF while all GPF requirements will be forwarded to Joint Forces Command as the Force Provider for GPF. Feasibility assessment requests will then be forwarded to the appropriate components for sourcing solutions. An arbitration mechanism, whether resolved by the Joint Staff, during a conference or other type of venue, should be in place to resolve any disagreements between the Joint Force Provider, the Force Providers and the Services.

375 **Services Developing SFA Capabilities**

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The Services have begun to develop considerable capability to address SFA requirements, but much of the capacity for SFA resides within larger organizational structures, such as the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and. Yet future SFA requirements

379 and the desires of potential host nations may demand, as historically has long been the
380 norm in FID operations, smaller teams of more senior, experienced personnel.⁴ While
381 larger structures have applicability in some SFA missions, they are often too large to
382 address many of the smaller scale requirements often associated with SFA missions.
383 Additionally, the Services will not only need to plan for sourcing steady state SFA
384 requirements, but also surge requirements which should be included in future revisions of
385 Combatant Commander OPLANS and CONPLANS.

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387 In recognition of these organizational challenges and in accordance with QDR 06
388 guidance, the Services have, or are developing, capabilities to address both current and
389 future SFA missions.

390 **U.S. Army**

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393 The Army is addressing their current SFA requirements with by deploying
394 Security Assistance Teams, which deployed specially trained teams in support of the
395 Geographic Combatant Commanders' requirements to support security assistance efforts.
396 The Army has also energized it's education and training, as evident by training over
397 7,700 students in FY 07 in security assistance roles and missions. The Army is also
398 providing soldiers, who undergo pre-deployment training, to Transition Teams in both
399 OIF and OEF.

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401 Future capabilities for the Army will result from the recent decision by the Vice
402 Chief of the Army to institutionalize capability with the Army to train SFA on an
403 enduring basis. This training institution will be capable of educating and training
404 individuals, teams and units for both Phase 0 (Steady State) and Phase 4 (Surge) SFA
405 missions. The Army is also making institutional improvements by executing an Action
406 Plan for Stability Operations which increases the capabilities of the force to execute these
407 type missions by making changes across DOTMLPF.

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409 The Army is also preparing for the reduction of demand (post OIF / OEF) of
410 forces with the development of the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) which
411 will provide elements of BCTs, functional, and multi-functional units to execute SFA and
412 related capacity building missions. These units will trained on a deployment METL
413 specifically designed for the SFA mission. Finally, the Army is considering designating
414 "Security Cooperation Brigade Combat Teams" that would be dedicated to these
415 missions on a regular basis.

416 **U.S. Marine Corps**

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419 The Marine Corps is currently developing the Marine Corps Training Advisory
420 Group (MCTAG) to train units prior to embarking on an SFA mission. The Marine
421 Corps is also developing a Marine Air Ground Task Force concept for security

⁴ Many nations are hesitant to accept a large US military presence, and this trend is likely to continue or increase post-OIF/OEF. To make acceptance of US forces conducting SFA more palatable will require small, culturally-attuned, experienced GPF and SOF.

422 cooperation called the SC MAGTF, which will serve as an additional world-wide
423 deployable capability alongside Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and unit deployment
424 program (UDP) units in accordance with the USMC Long War Concept.

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426 **Training and Education?**

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428 **Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning ?**

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430 **Etc.**

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432 **U.S. Navy**

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434 The Navy has the unique ability to bring inherent maritime capabilities to the SFA effort
435 which can support and compliment some of the Marine Corps effort. The combined USN
436 / USMC team can provide a flexible maritime “basing” capability that facilitates access
437 to countries. The Navy has significant capability to support current and future SFA GPF
438 missions, particularly Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), to accomplish this
439 mission and to provide support for USMC actions. Navy intends to align Navy IPO and
440 FMS efforts to achieve the footprint and sustainability that will accomplish the mission
441 and is acceptable to host nation and theater concerns

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443 The Expeditionary Training Command (ETC) provides focused and customized maritime
444 capabilities training to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements. Maritime
445 Expeditionary Security Forces provide a scalable and sustainable security team capable
446 of defending near-coast, in-shore and embarked assets

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448 **(Can these forces be utilized in a training role???)**

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450 **The Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion has capabilities that support Ministry of Interior**
451 **level activities such as police and detention facility operation. Resident expertise in**
452 **procendures, legal, self defense and weapons can be leveraged to meet SFA missions**
453 **requiring improving interior functions.**

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455 **Future concepts ???**

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457 **U.S Air Force**

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459 The Air Force is developing a Theater Air Advisory Squadron concept which provides
460 the COCOM air component an organic cadre to conduct SFA missions or to act as the
461 core of an augmented SFA mission. The Air Force is also evaluating the requirement for
462 a dedicated GPF advisory unit.

463

464 Can you think about more meat to put on the bones???

465

466 **Desired Outcomes**

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468 There are **two desired outcomes** for the 3 and 4-star Senior Leader Meetings:

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470 1. A mutual agreement on the general concepts of the roles of GPF and SOF on the SFA
471 continuum.

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473 2. An agreement in principle to the concept of a vetting process and criteria to determine
474 the best force for an SFA mission.

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476 **Conclusions**

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478 The need exists to establish policy and provide guidance at the Department level
479 that will delineate SFA responsibilities, relationships and authorities. Additionally, a
480 proponent for SFA should be designated to establish a common understanding of SFA
481 and to develop a deliberate and systematic approach to determine the best force(s) to
482 accomplish the SFA mission, develop SFA joint doctrine, identify required joint SFA
483 capabilities, develop joint SFA training and education for both individuals and units and
484 serve as a source of SFA expertise to Joint Task Forces and Combatant Commands. An
485 essential prerequisite for DOD to effectively conduct SFA mission is collaboration and
486 agreement among the Services, Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff in order to
487 maximize capabilities in a global environment of increasing demand for such activities.

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- 514 Appendices:
- 515 A – Army Initiatives Information Paper
- 516 B – USMC Information Paper
- 517 C – US Navy Initiatives Information Paper
- 518 D – Air Force Initiatives Information Paper (TBP)
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DRAFT

Appendix A

ARMY INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Key Army Initiatives Related to Army Capability to Conduct SFA.

1. Future Capabilities.

a. Enduring Training Capability for SFA. On 17 Jan 08, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army decided to institutionalize capability within the Army to train SFA on an enduring basis. TRADOC will develop an organizational design and operational concept by the end of Calendar Year 08, with full implementation expected to be complete no earlier than 1st Quarter, FY11. The training institution will be capable of educating and training individuals, teams and units for both phase 0 and phase 4 missions.

b. Modular Army Forces. Once demand from OIF/OEF is reduced to a manageable level, the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) will provide elements of BCTs, functional, and multi-functional units to execute SFA and related capacity building missions. These units will train on a Deployment Mission Essential Task List (METL) specifically designed for SFA. The Army is considering designating a number of BCTs as "Security Cooperation BCTs" that would be dedicated to these missions on a regional basis.

c. Institutional Improvements. The Army is executing an Action Plan for Stability Operations which increases the capabilities of the force to execute these operations and their subordinate tasks by making changes across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

2. Current Capabilities.

a. Security Assistance Teams. In FY07, the Army deployed 65 separate teams to 39 countries to support security assistance efforts. These teams logged more than 80,000 workdays overseas as they provided technical assistance, extended training service, mobile training teams, and pre-deployment site surveys.

b. Education and Training. In FY07, the institutional Army trained and educated over 7,700 students at 15 CONUS locations. This included FMS, IMET, Counter Narcotics (CN) and Counter Terrorism Force Protection (CTFP) funded programs supporting all five GCCs.

c. Current Transition Team Requirements. The Army contributes over 8,000 personnel to the TT mission in OIF/OEF, including individual augmentees, teams and whole units up to the brigade level. The Army has dedicated an entire brigade to conduct this training.

Appendix B

USMC INFORMATION PAPER

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Subj: Marine Corps Training Advisory Group

Purpose: TO PROVIDE US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM) WITH BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE MARINE CORPS TRAINING ADVISORY GROUP (MCTAG)

Discussion:

a. A Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) was commissioned by the Commandant in October 2007. Initially established to address staffing and sourcing requirements for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MCTAG's purpose is to source the Marine Corps' advisory capability to support mission requirements that exceed those of SC MAGTFs. An embryonic capability now, it will eventually grow to constitute a cadre of trained advisors organized into regional branches that deploy scalable teams of Marine advisors to partner nations. Marine Corps advisors will also facilitate the development of critical relationships and enable civil-military operations and security cooperation opportunities by serving as an interface with partner nation military forces assisting regional MARFOR interaction with select US and partner nation government agencies, including the US country teams and attachés.

b. Marine advisors will establish enduring relationships that facilitate the interaction between the SC MAGTF and partner government agencies and security forces with whom they will be working. Supportive to the efforts of the SC MAGTF, Marine advisors will constitute a significant enabler that enhances the effectiveness of the SC MAGTF in the future security environment.

c. When not deployed, Marine advisors will provide training to SC MAGTF and other units designated to conduct BPC events. Marine advisors will be capable of supporting SC MAGTF pre-deployment training programs as well as providing reinforcement to cultural and language training provided by the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). Ultimately, the Marine advisors will provide a critical continuity for Marine efforts to engage across the shaping and deterrence phases of operations. The SC MAGTF will not be in the Marine advisors' chain of command, but SC MAGTF will nonetheless establish critical relationships with the Marine advisors. Based upon the CCDR security cooperation plan (SCP), the regional MARFOR will command and control both Marine advisors and SC MAGTFs. The deployment schedule of Marine advisors and SC MAGTF will be offset to ensure effective continuity of capacity building efforts within the theater of operation. The maintenance of relationships between US forces and partner nation military leaders is thus enabled. A significant benefit of this offset in deployment schedules will be the ability of the Marine advisors to facilitate the introduction of newly arriving SC MAGTF elements into the theater. In order to preclude a loss in the persistent nature of this US presence, the MEU operating in the region also will be available to conduct training while the SC MAGTF elements transition into theater.

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Appendix C

NAVY INFORMATION PAPER

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621 Subj: NAVY CONTRIBUTION TO SFA EFFORTS
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623 1. The Sea Services' unified maritime strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century*
624 *Seapower*, states that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. As a means to accomplish
625 this goal, the expeditionary nature of the Navy's globally distributed, mission-tailored maritime
626 forces will continue to focus on fostering and sustaining cooperative relationships with more
627 international partners. The Navy believes that persistent presence without permanence is a more
628 effective means of partner capacity building than establishing a permanent footprint. The Navy
629 has the unique ability to bring inherent maritime capabilities to the SFA effort, in addition to
630 supporting and complimenting USMC efforts. The combined USN/USMC team can provide a
631 flexible maritime capability that utilizes repeated, shorter term engagements that maximize the
632 benefit to the host nation without causing saturation conditions or creating dependency.
633

634 2. In particular, the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative seeks a cooperative approach to
635 maritime security, promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons
636 proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Through a joint, multinational, and
637 interagency force, Global Maritime Partnerships both enhances regional maritime security and
638 directly contributes to the SFA mission. Recent engagement examples such as the Africa
639 Partnership Station leveraged a staff from 11 nations to provide training to 15 nations using a full
640 spectrum of maritime platforms, providing inland reach and influence. Navy SFA capabilities
641 directly supported this Global Maritime Partnerships initiative and provide focused capacity
642 building activities. The Navy is increasingly utilizing Fleet assets and associated Subject Matter
643 Expert Encounters (SMEE), to fulfill the "Advise" role of TAA/SFA, where this can be
644 accomplished under Title 10 roles and responsibilities.
645

646 3. Numerous capabilities currently reside within the Navy to meet the Security Force Assistance
647 (SFA) mission set. By analyzing Train, Advise, and Assist requirements, the Navy is currently
648 engaged in numerous training and assisting missions via Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
649 (NECC), Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) and the Navy Education and Training
650 Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA). The capability to build partner capacity
651 currently resides largely in these organizations, and plans to synchronize their activities with
652 other ongoing SFA efforts can be developed in conjunction with SFA/TAA mission requirements.
653

654 4. The Navy, through NIPO, is a key enabler of DoD programs, including Foreign Military Sales
655 (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training
656 (IMET), to accomplish some functions within the SFA mission area. NIPO supports COCOMs in
657 fulfilling their Theater Security Cooperation Plans and conducting GWOT, as well as supporting
658 DoN international security cooperation objectives. Through NIPO, the Navy can help to meet the
659 COCOM-identified training and equipment needs of partner nations through focused foreign sales
660 and training that build partner capacity. It should be noted that these programs are almost
661 exclusively funded by monies outside the DoN's direct control (either partner nation (FMS) or
662 DoS/DoD directed (FMF/IMET/others)). The Navy is working to utilize engagements by senior
663 leadership with international partners to align partner nations priorities with COCOM regional
664 objectives (i.e. – to generate FMS programs that are aligned with strategy), as well as to highlight

665 gaps in important maritime capabilities that could be filled utilizing USG-funded programs (FMF,
666 IMET, NDAA Section 1206, et al)..

667

668 5. The Navy's main execution agent for maritime training in support of SFA/TAA programs
669 noted above is NETSAFA. NETSAFA programs, schedules, and obtains quotas for international
670 students receiving maritime training under Security Assistance (SA) and Security Cooperation
671 (SC) programs at INCONUS training activities or via Mobile Training/Education Teams
672 (MTT/MET). This training may be funded by FMS, FMF, IMET or other specifically
673 appropriated monies (counter drug, NDAA Section 1206, et al). NETSAFA has managed
674 MTTs/METs for more than 2,100 international students this FY and an additional 2,500
675 international students are expected to be trained via MTTs/METs by the end of FY08 under
676 various SA and SC programs.

677

678 6. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command supports the Navy's strategic vision of the SFA
679 mission with several unique organizations and capabilities:

680

681 a. Expeditionary Training Command (ETC) provides timely, focused, and customized
682 maritime capabilities training at the host nation request. Using various funding streams
683 such as IMET, FMS, and 1206, ETC can provide training that supports the USG's Global
684 Maritime Partnerships initiative with the intent of enhancing global self sustaining
685 maritime security capability.

686

687 b. Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces provide a scalable and sustainable security team
688 capable of defending near-coast, in-shore, and embarked assets.

689

690 c. Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion has capabilities that support Ministry of Interior
691 level activities such as police and detention facility operation. Resident expertise in
692 procedures, legal, self defense, and weapons can be leveraged to train and advise partners
693 in deficient interior functions.

694

695 d. Navy Construction Forces (NCF), commonly referred to as "SeaBees," have capabilities
696 to conduct deployable engineering and construction in support of operating forces,
697 including roads, bridges, bunkers, airfields and logistics. Additional capabilities include
698 furnishing assistance to host nation forces, civilian agencies, and civic action projects that
699 complement the nation-building programs.