A Certain Trumpet

General Maxwell Taylor was certainly one of this country’s most courageous combat leaders in WW II and Korea, and our most brilliant military visionary and intellectual of the 20th Century. After his tour as Army Chief of Staff (1955-1959), he wrote “The Uncertain Trumpet”, in which he presented some exceedingly well justified recommendations for bold changes in our national military strategy, and our military leadership organization and decision making at the highest levels.

His WW II combat experience with the then recently organized 82d Airborne Division, and later as Commander, 101st Airborne Division, proved to him that new and different types of combat capability could present additional and effective dimensions to modern warfare. His experience as Eighth Army Commander in Korea in 1953 probably confirmed for him the limitations and shortfalls of the national strategy of Massive Retaliation.

As the Army Chief of Staff, he attempted in every manner possible, to cause a change of the national military strategy of massive retaliation to one of flexible response, with a redistribution of resources within the services and major changes in roles and missions for the different services. In the senior military and political community in Washington, it would seem that General Taylor was the only one at that time who heard this “certain trumpet”.

After his tour as the Army Chief of Staff and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Taylor was totally convinced of the clarity of another “certain trumpet”. It is obvious in his book that he felt that the organization and operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was both ineffective and unworkable in its present form, particularly during periods of conflict. In its present form, he wrote that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had the characteristics of a committee. His recommendations to improve the military decision making and advice to the national civilian leadership included a single Defense Chief of Staff, with Deputy Defense Chiefs of Staff from each of the other services, and a joint supporting staff. This Defense Chief of Staff would be the senior military officer of these United States, and report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Chiefs of Staff for each service would be left to focus in one direction; to recruit, train, equip, and do what is best for the Troops of their respective service. The Defense Chief of Staff and his Deputies should concentrate on planning, preparation and war fighting at the strategic level. Any differences between the Defense Chief of Staff and the Service Chiefs of Staff would be worked out through the Secretary of Defense.

General Taylor also recommended the organization of an independent Military Council consisting of one four star officer from each service on their last active duty assignment or retired, and not carried on the active roll of any service. This council would not have a permanent chairman, and would provide appropriate advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. The members of this Council should be the most experienced in the operations and capabilities of their particular service, and not just popular in the cocktail circuit in D.C. The Council members should be fiercely independent in their assessments and advice, and should never be “required” to formulate a consensus on issues.

If anyone or any organization/agency conducts an objective critique of this nation’s military strategy, advice, influence and actions/inactions over the past five decades, this recommendation by General Taylor reference the Joint Chiefs of Staff might assume significant relevance. Let there be no confusion; in this paper I am discussing actions and organizational structure at the highest levels and not the actions of those in the field. Our troops, unit leaders, and our military families have responded, and continue to respond, to our nation’s requirements with such courage, stamina, and professional abilities that have exceeded all historical standards of selfless service to this nation. Their assigned mission(s) have been accomplished beyond any measure that could reasonably be expected during this past decade of fighting a somewhat different type of warfare with difficult limitations, and against forces without nation state affiliation. Readers are advised also that the points raised and the questions poised are not done so to attack personally those in position of authority at the time but to bring to the surface issues that could possibly provide better and safer operations for the future, for the benefit of those in the field.

The operational relationships between the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and our growing organization of combatant commands, deemed necessary to carry out the operational aspects of our national strategy, needs serious study. In the implementation of our national strategy this past decade, one must ask what was the advice of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the responsible combatant commander when it was decided to only use Special Forces and CIA teams with the warlords and tribal leaders in Afghanistan to defeat the Al Qaeda and Taliban, without the support of conventional forces to at least block the egress routes, to kill or capture the enemy irregular forces, and prevent their escape to Pakistan. The Special Forces, CIA and Afghanistan forces accomplished their missions extremely well, but one of the first principles taught irregular forces is, “when victory is not possible – live to fight another day”. They did and they are!

At the start of the Iraq war, what was the advice of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, when the responsible combatant commander reached Baghdad, pulled down the statue of Saddam, declared victory, and left Iraq with his command headquarters. We as a nation had just begun a major war and the theater commander departs the battlefield? Not even the land component commander was left to accomplish the tasks but an ad hoc headquarters with, as yet, an unexplained mission? What did our coalition forces think? Was our assessment of the population dynamics of this country so wrong, or did we disregard our intelligence and regional experience, and rely entirely on the advice of some of the self-serving Iraqi here in U.S.?

With the staff of the combatant command, the staffs of each component command, the Ambassador’s staff, the Joint Staff, the DOD staff, and the State Department all involved, who was directly responsible for determining the mission in Iraq during the initial years? The situation in country was certainly made worse when a Department of State representative was place in charge in Iraq of what was clearly still a military operation.

When the Coalition Forces initially occupied Iraq, the Iraqi people began immediately to rebuild their lives, their homes, shops, schools, normal routines, etc. While not overjoyed with the foreign forces in Iraq, the people felt that since the greatest, most respected military in the world, was in charge that they were secure and that it was safe to resume their activities and new freedoms. Many families returned home from Jordan and other countries. Trucks were bumper to bumper on the four lane highways to and from Jordan and Syria, carrying desired and necessary supplies. The number of private autos, cell phones, etc., grew daily. The people soon learned that the Coalition Forces were not going to secure the country and even seemed disinterested in securing their own 10 kilometer route to Baghdad Airport. There was an exception. The 101st Airborne Division had its Area of Responsibility (AOR) well secured and its commander knew exactly what needed to be done.

What were the actions and advice of our senior military leadership when it required over three years of contract debacles to begin receiving the equipment necessary to organize, equip and train the Iraqi security forces. If Iraqi security forces had been equipped, trained and placed on the streets and in the neighborhoods during the first three months of the “occupation”, and if Army Special Forces teams had been placed with the major tribes and factions with the resources to train and equip them, it would have helped greatly to fill the security vacuum, and prevent the sectarian violence and infiltration of Al Qaeda/other operatives. When General David Petraeus was assigned the responsibility to train and equip the Iraqi security forces, he clearly was behind a power curve due to three years of bureaucratic nonsense, international politics, and inaction(s) of the State and Defense Departments. General Petraeus quickly began to produce the much needed numbers of trained and equipped Iraqi forces which provided the indigenous security foundation for the success of the U.S. force surge later. During that later force surge, General Petraeus more effectively utilized the unconventional indirect and direct action forces to greater advantage to improve the security within Iraq. While there can never be absolute long-term guarantees on the results of any conflict, the U.S. military has certainly given the Iraqi people their best opportunity and foundation for a democratic republic. With reasonably honest and representative government, Iraq has the natural resources and industrious, intelligent people necessary to become the richest and most powerful country in the Middle East. Only time will tell!

One would hope that our institutions are studying the events of this past decade and the actions of our senior military leadership to determine if our organizational structures and processes for selection of our senior “war fighters” are appropriate for the present and future. In the Army (and I suspect the other services as well), we seem to spend a lot of effort determining the right structure of brigades (and below) units, and the selection of the right leaders to fight those units. Perhaps, after this past decade, it is time to give more study to higher levels of structure and leadership. A good start would be to have selection boards for our three and four star positions to better insure the most qualified are chosen for operational commands and to eliminate the impression/possibility of favoritism. The military and civilian leadership seem too comfortable with our bloated staff structure of combatant commands together with each of their collection of service component commands. Just how many of these commands do we need? How much of our war fighting strength is tied up in the supporting staffs of these commands. Can anyone imagine how many levels of staff bureaucracy that the commander of the ad hoc command left in Iraq, after the combatant command with the assigned component commands left country, had to deal with? Does anyone really believe that this commander had any idea what the intent of the Commander in Chief was for Iraq? The on-site commander of any conflict of the size discussed here needs to speak and listen to the Commander in Chief as often as possible to completely understand what is expected of him and his command. The current national military and civilian leadership appear to be too concerned with the creation of “celebrity generals” to allow this direct interface. This concern was not a problem to the Commander in Chief during WW II but then it was a much larger conflict and his primary concern was total victory, as quickly as possible. The position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been filled, most of this past decade of two land wars, by Admirals and Marines which seems contrary to logic also. As a nation, and as the only substantial western military force remaining, we need to seriously reflect on the last decade of conflict and make the necessary changes/improvements (even bold ones) across the board to insure that we are prepared for future conflicts, wherever/whatever they are. If we could not construct a strategy to win quickly in Iraq and Afghanistan, what can the nation expect if there are problems with China, Iran or North Korea?

The most definitive “certain trumpet” which has been proven over the past half century is in regards to the organization, command and control, preparation, and conduct of unconventional warfare by our nation’s defense structure. With few exceptions, such as General Petraeus, the conventional military leadership has had little knowledge, respect, or regard for the unconventional forces or their mission(s). This is surprising since it has been the most prevalent form of warfare occurring around the world since WW II. The obvious fact that an insurgency was occurring in Iraq could not even be mentioned in the Pentagon since the civilian leadership had dismissed the possibility.

President John F. Kennedy and his advisors were obviously impressed with the opinions and recommendations of General Taylor. In June 1961, President Kennedy asked General Taylor to head the Cuba Study Group, charged with studying the Bay of Pigs debacle and make recommendations on policy matters relative to guerrilla warfare. In July 1961, General Taylor was recalled to active duty as the Military Advisor to President Kennedy and led a mission to South Vietnam to recommend courses of action that the U.S. might pursue there. His report recommended that a U.S. military presence in Vietnam should function primarily as a logistical task force and as an emergency reserve in a crisis.

In October 1961, President Kennedy was briefed on the capabilities of Army Special Forces in unconventional warfare by General Yarborough at Fort Bragg. During this visit, President Kennedy authorized the Green Beret for wear by the members of the Army Special Forces in spite of the Army’s opposition. By this unprecedented action, President Kennedy made it profoundly clear that he recognized that the Army Special Forces were distinctly different warriors with a distinctly different mission which would become far more relevant in this nation’s foreign policy actions in the future.

In October 1962, General Taylor was sworn in as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and held that position until July 1964. After President Kennedy was assassinated in late 1963, General Taylor remained as Chairman for approximately six months, and took the lead in forming the JCS recommendation that American efforts in Vietnam be “an intensified counterinsurgency campaign in the south and selective air and naval attacks against targets in North Vietnam”. It is the belief of this writer that the war in Vietnam would have been fought somewhat differently and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have been changed had President Kennedy remained as President through two terms with General Taylor as his primary military advisor. I believe also that General Taylor fully appreciated the mission and utility of the Army Special Forces, particularly, their counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam and their worldwide application against this prevalent choice of warfare.

One Army Special Forces Group with Special Forces teams training, equipping, leading advising, and fighting alongside indigenous forces across South Vietnam, the Special Forces Command in Vietnam was able to maintain 50,000 local soldiers along the borders and in key areas, accomplishing the full range of counterinsurgency missions and providing strategic/tactical intelligence to the U.S. and South Vietnamese units. The Special Forces Command provided many of their own ground reinforcement units with American led indigenous fighters. As the U.S. deployed more conventional units to Vietnam, so did the North Vietnamese until North Vietnam has all its regular divisions except one in South Vietnam. When the Army Special Forces Group was redeployed to U.S. in 1970, and their former indigenous forces became part of the conventional South Vietnamese forces, most of their local capabilities for area security and strategic/tactical reconnaissance were lost. South Vietnam was unable also to support, tactically and logistically, the isolated camps established by Special Forces along the borders.

The very public debacle of Desert One, under the Carter Administration, brought the serious neglect of the unconventional forces by the national military leadership to the attention of Congress. This neglect was predictable as had been the case since the military type missions accomplished so well by OSS during WW II were transferred from the CIA to the military. Unfortunately, the reaction to this neglect highlighted by Desert One was a return to our military comfort zone with the establishment of another major joint command, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), together with all its component service commands and with operational control of all U.S. “Special Operations Forces”. At the time of this decision, the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Special Forces Groups represented the expertise, doctrine and experienced ground personnel in unconventional warfare (UW), counterinsurgency (COIN), foreign internal defense (FID), psychological operations, and civil affairs, since being organized in 1952. They still represent the expertise in these areas of irregular warfare today! There were also highly trained direct action teams/individuals within the Special Forces Command which, together with elements of the Air Commandos, had accomplished the Son Tay Raid, and some had participated in the ill-fated Desert One operation. The Army Special Forces Groups at this time represented at least 75-85% of the “boots on the ground” special operations troops. Instead of maximizing the use of this established center of expertise and experience, SOCOM and the component commands all began or continued to expand their own special operations schools and activities. Our military structure now has a long list of component command redundant operations, schools, training courses, agencies, contractor organizations, weapons and equipment requirements, etc., etc., competing for the special operations funding. Similar to most major joint commands, SOCOM has become a large, expensive, bureaucratic headquarters with the requirement to keep all components happy. Billions have been spent on building and maintaining a few midget submarines, together with other special operations capable submarines, for SEAL Teams. Some already lack the capability to be maintained in a readiness for use if such a situation presented itself. Billions are presently being spent on training and equipping a couple of thousand of Marines for routine three year tours in special operations under SOCOM. After over two decades of claiming that “all Marines are special operations capable”, the USMC pushed to become a part of SOCOM. With all the worldwide missions the USMC has, one has to wonder why they would want to add another one? SOCOM funding is helping with the equipment and infrastructure to support this redundancy and duplication in UW/FID capability. After two somewhat questionable deployments to Afghanistan, a USMC battalion size unit will now be deployed and will require the loan of mission critical communications equipment from the Army Special Forces. It would seem that if SOCOM needed the additional personnel for UW/FID missions, it would have been more cost effective to recruit and train more Army Special Forces personnel who normally remain in this specialty for an entire career. All these types of costly expenditures are occurring when the Air Force special operations C-130 aircraft are old and difficult to maintain in the numbers needed. The Army Special Forces Groups still, after many decades of stated requirements and actions, do not have any organic aircraft, fixed wing or rotary wing. We seem to be welded to the Carter Doctrine used during Desert One that to be joint, all services must be involved, regardless of need, training, capability or duplication.

Since the establishment of SOCOM there have certainly been many successful operations conducted by special operation forces. Unfortunately, most of these cannot be shared with the public. The Army Special Forces and CIA teams, with superb Air Force support, did an incredible job of advising, assisting, and leading the indigenous forces in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda at the start of the war. This was a classic Army Special Forces UW operation and reminiscence of the OSS operations in WW II. As stated, the victory was short-lived since the Special Forces teams were not left with the tribes to complete a FID/COIN mission. The direct action teams in Iraq and Afghanistan have done an outstanding job of killing and capturing terrorist leaders (and Saddam Hussein), and destroying terrorist cells. However, some of the known disasters that have gotten public attention could have been addressed in more detail with the American public without disclosing operational techniques. In Somalia, the casualty count was over twice that of Desert One. Even though the on-ground, immediate commander took full responsibility for the results of the operation and the Secretary of Defense was replaced, it would have been helpful to hear from the SOCOM and CENTCOM commanders as to why the operation was allowed to proceed when such basic support as the C-130 gunships were not provided. After three decades of joint special operations, a four man SEAL recon team was employed in the difficult mountains of Afghanistan. After the team’s presence was compromised by locals, the team was not extracted but remained to be overwhelmed by a large enemy force, killing three of the four. The CH-47 load of reinforcements sent to assist the team apparently was without armed escort (C-130, A-10, AH-64, etc.?) and was destroyed by enemy fire while attempting to land, with all aboard killed. This action also produced a casualty list over twice that of Desert One. Terrible events happen in war but it would have been reassuring also to hear from the major commanders (SOCOM and CENTCOM) as to what action would be taken to insure the availability of such basic support and better contingency planning in similar operations. One can only suppose that the investigations of such high casualty events due to the lack of basic support caused the necessary changes in operational procedures.

The recent changes by SOCOM in the command and control of special operations units in a combat theater are worth mentioning. It is not the structure of these joint task force headquarters that gives one pause but the policies that permit anyone of the necessary rank in SOCOM and it component commands to head these controlling commands. They are not selected necessarily based on the majority of the service or the mission(s) of the personnel they will command. A Ranger, a Marine, a pilot, a SEAL, a Special Forces, or any other SOCOM officer can be selected to command these task force headquarters in the combat zones, regardless of skill set. The only prerequisite seems to be that they would be a member of SOCOM. This solution certainly doesn’t give a lot of confidence to those they are commanding that their immediate commander knows and understands the capabilities/limitations of the troops accomplishing the mission. This type of “jointness” would seem to be a military version of “political correctness”? Some examples in the recent past would seem to rule against such extreme “jointness”. The disastrous employment of the four man SEAL team as mentioned previously; or when a Special Forces captain and NCO were officially considered for court martial because they killed a wanted Al Qaeda leader on the battlefield; or the tragic incident of Ranger Tillman who was killed by friendly fire while serving in Afghanistan while under his chain of command, which submitted the erroneous reports and award recommendations of enemy action, but it was the Special Forces general located in U.S. who received the reprimand as a result of this incident; are some incidents which come to mind. After Desert One, many asked “how could our elite forces do the Son Tay Raid so well, and then Desert One so badly”? Simple-there were expert night capable aviators flying the aircraft as one service team and the expert ground combat troops as another service team, all commanded by an experienced officer who had worked extensively with both teams, and knew their capabilities? When the Navy needed snipers to take down the pirates, they did not ask SOCOM to draw straws for this selection. They gave the mission to those SEALs trained to do that specific job. Testing likely models for failure is not very wise during combat operations.

It has been thirty years since a serious look was given to the organization, command and control, and conduct of operations of our nation’s elite special operations forces. There have been and continue to be ample examples of the many types of operations accomplished by these forces across the spectrum of warfare, to be able to determine the most effective organization for their readiness and employment. It is time to re-examine this critical national capability and how we can improve its many parts.

From the beginning of the global war on terror (GWOT), direct action operations have been the priority for the special operations forces for many reasons. Not the least of which has been the demand at all levels for rapid results. While many of these direct actions were necessary, such a priority and limited strategy ignores many of the other causes of insurgencies. The direct action missions should continue to be the priority of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), formed to accomplish those missions, and this commander should have permanent operational control of all the supporting units he requires for his worldwide mission(s). This command should be under the direct control of the National Command Authority, and placed under the operational control of the combatant commanders only when required. This command certainly does not need SOCOM as an additional higher headquarters to supervise or control/monitor its operations. I certainly do not think the highest levels of competence can be reached by an elite unit with the personnel, equipment, training, etc., being somewhat affected by each of four services. Nor do I believe that the musical chairs assignment of the commanders, in the spirit of jointness, contributes to the continuity, readiness or effectiveness of the organization. In a combat theater, the direct action warriors should be separate from those who accomplish the UW, COIN and FID missions. It is difficult to kick down the door of a tribal chief one night and come back later saying “I am here to help you”. The worldwide planning responsibility for counterterrorism operations given to SOCOM by the former SECDEF should be returned to JCS. JCS, through the combatant commanders, has the worldwide planning responsibility for all regional operations or conflicts, and can order assistance, advice and/or deployment of special operations forces, when required.

History has shown over the past half century that the United States Special Forces Command should be organized and manned as a separate department or agency outside of DOD, much like the U.S. Coast Guard, and with its own civilian leadership. This command would have the exclusive missions of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, civil affairs and irregular warfare. While a bold move, this is the best solution for this country to have and maintain an effective capability in these increasing important areas. All personnel of this command would be members of this same special service, wear the same uniforms, have the same chain of command, and the career fields for it members would be the responsibility of the command. All internal training and schooling for the command would be accomplished by the command’s own JFK Special Warfare Center and School. This command should have the necessary aircraft, weapons, vehicles and equipment needed to accomplish its worldwide missions, such as the missions being accomplished now in the Philippines, Columbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. There would remain a close working relationship and liaison with all major military commands, particularly, in the combat zones. The National Command Authority would assign the missions to this command, as required. The command would also work closely with the U.S. Embassies and other special U.S. representatives where necessary. The command should be required to maintain the necessary experts in the jobs pertaining to FID and COIN operations that we have not been able to get the civilians from DOS, AID, and other departments to do in a combat zone. The Congress should pass the necessary laws to permit this service, like the National Guard and Coast Guard, to work with all national, state and local government agencies, particularly, those involved in security and law enforcement(CIA, FBI, ATF, DEA, etc.,). This command should have the ability to assist, advice, train, and support American communities much like they do in foreign countries, as part of its own training. It could be supporting the city of Salinas, Ca. now in its ongoing gang related insurgency, for example. It could also be of great benefit to border security operations and humanitarian missions in the isolated areas of this country. The command would, of course, maintain a close relationship for training or for the exchange of personnel with JSOC for direct action missions, since the Special Forces personnel must be expert in the teaching of direct action operations. Difficult ? Not really, if we are serious as a nation to exploit this capability to the maximum, and not have this capability overshadowed by those who are most interested in large tank and artillery battles, the fastest jets, the biggest bombs, or carrier battle groups. Considering what our nation has experienced since WW II and, particularly, this past decade, we should plot a new and different direction to greatly improve our ability to successfully conduct or prevent limited/irregular warfare. By taking a new, bold direction and separating this critical capability from the present overgrown civilian and military defense structure, it could gain the emphasis and priority needed to greatly expand its usefulness to this nation’s foreign policy.

Perhaps as a nation, we could even escape from our post WW II mindset and organizational models, and consider these bold changes in the operational structures of our special operations forces and our top military leadership organization. If the past decade of indecision and confused actions does not motivate innovative thought, then we are totally captured by the past. As General Taylor quoted: “For if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?”—Corinthians 14:8.

Ed Scholes
Veterans of Special Forces