Hearing of House Armed Services Committee (HASC), 17 April 2007

Editor's Note:
VSF members, Major General Sid Shachnow and Major General Jim Guest were invited to and did testify before this HASC meeting. Here is General Shachnow's opening statement which is also the VSF position.

April 17, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Representative Thornberry, and distinguished members of the committee. It is indeed an honor for me to be here. I know you are knowledgeable about SOF, their capabilities and accomplishments as they celebrate their 20th anniversary as a command established by legislation.

As good as they are and as capable as they are led, there is always room for improvements. I would like to share with you five areas that I think warrant attention.

1. Direct vs. Indirect
There is this customary believe that SOF is a homogenous group. The truth is we are about as homogenous as a low priced sausage. Basically you can break us down into two separate ideological camps. On one end of the spectrum is the "conventional purist" who subscribes to direct, kinetic approach and on the other end the "pragmatic conservative" who believes in the none-kinetic, indirect approach. The trick is to strike a balance so as to achieve the synergy desired. For both approaches are important and can compliment each other. There is general acknowledgement that the indirect approach is ultimately decisive. This approach predominantly is conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees mostly by Special Forces, the green berets. For they are technically proficient and in addition are trained in language, interpersonal skills, with the proper cultural and regional orientation. They bring maturity and experience to this complicated, multifaceted battlefield. There are others who make that claim, but even a cursory examination will reveal the falsehood.

Since the advent of Iraq and Afghanistan the enthusiasm and emphasis has been on direct action. Because 80% of SOF is deployed in those two countries, direct action dominates. Needless to say the "conventional purists" are very pleased and comfortable with that trend. It is not difficult to understand why. They are comfortable with that approach because in part it is consistent with the way we historically wage war as a country:
a. Apolitical
b. Astrategic
c. Ahistorical
d. Optimistic Problem Solvers
e. Culturally Challenged
f. Technological Dependent
g. Focused on Fire Power and Lethality
h. Aggressive and Offensive
i. Large Scale
j. Impatient
k. Logistically Excellent
l. Casualty Sensitive
m. Limited Time Horizon

But are these characteristics compatible with Irregular Warfare??? And the answer is not really. The disproportionate emphasis on the direct approach raises the body count and gives us instant gratification; it is nothing more than the application of symptomatic medication, it will not address the disease. Firming up the capacities of partner states to manage their own security by providing them with training, equipment and intelligence would produce more lasting results. As the old saying goes "give a man a fish and he will eat for a day, but teach him how to fish and he will feed himself for life".

Of course the "Conventional Purist" will attempt to debate and dispute this criticism. However, the close examination of exciting plans and culture make it clear that direct action is the vital center of our current thinking. I am a firm believer in "Show me the money and investment of resources and I will show you the strategy". Currently, direct action rules, a short sighted approach.

2. Glass Ceiling
Closely related to the "Direct Action" issue is the perception that it is career enhancing to be serving in "black" units doing "Direct Action". In the early years, when I and my colleagues first joined Special Forces there was a clear understanding that if you stayed in you would hit a glass ceiling at field grade level, provided you lasted that long. The perception today is that the ceiling has moved. The chances that you will be promoted beyond Major General as a Green Beret are slim. Here again the defenders will point out the number of Special Forces generals in the inventory. That is not surprising for they constitute the largest force in SOF community. But that is not the issue. The concern is -- are they positioned to go beyond Major General and historically what has been the record. Projections for the immediate future do not look promising.

3. Special Forces Education
The army’s Intermediate Level Education (ILE) model does not satisfy the needs of the Special Forces officer. The SF officer enters the community as a Captain. Upon completion of the qualification course he is prepared to command a Special Forces A Detachment. The Q course or qualification course is the last time he will be exposed to SOF formal training and education. There is no dispute that additional education is required to prepare him for field grade duties. The mistake that was made was to pin our hopes on modifying the Command and General Staff College, Intermediate Level Education curriculum to accommodate our needs. Over the years we have entered into memorandums of agreement and understanding that have been ignored and broken by the Combined Arms Center. Negotiations normally turn out to be an exchange of platitudes and not a solution to the problem. This is what is occurring right now as I speak to you. I hold out no hope that we can work out an acceptable arrangement and solution. The SOF community needs to make a bold move and look at a clear alternative. One very promising option is to adjust the curriculum of the Naval Postgraduate School where some of our officers go and have the remainder attend it. There are other alternatives that need to be explored. I know that the Army Special Operations Command is aware of this issue and are examining alternatives. Unfortunately we sometimes achieve paralysis through analysis. I hope this is not the case here. Yes, it would require funding, but it would be minimal and I hope you would give it favorable consideration if they choose that path.

4. Special Forces Growth
The planned Special Forces growth of one battalion per year starting next year through 2012 is critical. Although it will not give us an additional capability, it is important for it will provide additional capacity and allow us to moderate the current operational tempo. The current tempo is unsustainable. We have individuals who are on their seventh and ninth deployment. Granted the deployments are for only seven months but there is a cumulative effect. The bottom line is that we are turning the force too fast. There is insufficient dwell time, to train, reset and reinvigorate the force. We do not know the true impact on families; it is clear that unhappy family members have a corrosive effect. Although the expansion has been approved, our budgetary process is unpredictable at best. Your support and attention is critical.

5. Civil Affairs Capability
Our Civil Affairs units and their capability are essential toward achieving mission success. They are the great humanitarians on the battle field. Civil Affairs come in two flavors, generalist who are primarily in the active force. Currently they are well trained and are very capable. They primarily meet the tactical commander’s needs. And then there are the specialists, who are predominantly in the reserves. In the 1960s there were 21 functional areas.
1. Arts, Monuments and Archives
2. Civil Defense
3. Civil Information
4. Civilian Supply
5. Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees
6. Economics and Commerce
7. Food and Agriculture
8. Labor
9. Legal
10. Property Control
11. Public Administration
12. Public Communications
13. Public Education
14. Public Finance
15. Public Health
16. Public Safety
17. Public Transportation
18. Public Welfare
19. Public Works and Utilities
20. Religious Relations
21. Language .

The draft facilitated staffing these teams with mostly qualified individuals. Over time they have morphed to the current broad six areas:
1. Public Health
2. Infrastructure
3. Economic
4. Rule of Law
5. Governance
6. Public Information & Education .

This was nothing more than a repacking effort. It did not add capability or solve a long standing problem. We have not been able to explain what are the specific skill levels and standards required for entry level and how are those skills achieved. There are no military institutions that train and educate in those skills. Further more how are these skills sustained? Periodically, when challenged a very qualified individual, like a judge will be paraded as being a member of the "Rule of Law" section. It is a stretch to accept that as a capability. When we speak of strategic Civil Affairs, we have to admit that we have a problem. .

I’ll be happy to answer your questions.