God bless those who run around in circles for they shall be known as wheels.

This is being hailed as New Doctrine for U.S. Special Operations Forces. Actually it is a rewrite of an old manual. Notice it is signed by a conventional Lieutenant General (LTG).

Joint Special Operations
Task Force Operations
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05_01.pdf

Surprised? We shouldn't be. (Then) LTG Petreaus edited the Counter insurgency (COIN) Field Manual and got a 4th star. Today, the US Army has 48 LTGs competing for only 14 four star billets. No-telling how many of the Special Forces (SF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) manuals are being re-written by generals whose only SF experience was meeting a few of our best at War College cocktail parties.

Suddenly everyone is an unconventional Warfare (UW) expert and wants it done their way. And they are willing to re-write an old manual to prove it. Just what those Captains and Sergeants in a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) need - a new 400 page doctrine manual written by rear echelon Department of Defense (DOD) staff officers. This manual smells like CYA all the way.

Every JSOTF is task organized and therefore different. I am not opposed to manuals, but in fast moving, fluid unconventional war situations flexible Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) prepared by the JSOTF assigned the mission, and based on the area of operations and the specific units assigned the mission are a much better solution.

Here is how it works. Usually the JSOTF Commander is a Special Forces Group or Battalion Commander. The JSOTF Commander (A Colonel or below) briefs the conventional generals on a proposed SOF operation. After the briefing, the generals retire for coffee, drinks and cigars and make their decisions. The JSOTF Commander is not invited to this decision meeting because he is not a general. This is a huge mistake.

If JCS really wants to improve the SOF mission situation and JSOTF capability, they should make JSOTF Commands a one star position. That would ensure at least one trained UW operator is in the decision room. This would likely require making the Special Forces Group Commander position a one star billet, something that should have been done long ago.

Getting back to the manual. My first impression is it is purely a CYA activity. It is the equivalent of trying to remove the blindfold from the person trying to pin the tail on a donkey. Suspected departures from this new manual will now be the basis for future investigations of SF and SOF Operations. And of course it will provide cover and camouflage for conventional generals to use to deflect attention from themselves by punishing SF/SOF Operators for deviating from a (now) written JCS doctrine. What they really need to learn is that what they perceive as donkeys are really young, strong and fast stallions. Stallions that can and will win races but only when the reins are relaxed and never when the reins are tightened.

Should we yield to higher rank and arbitrarily trust DOD's conventional generals with our unconventional warfare doctrine? Absolutely Not. DOD was founded in 1946 and America has not won a war since.

This manual is so precise (deliberately so I might add) it is the equivalent of tightening the reins on the few Special Forces qualified planning officers we have. Do our conventional 4 stars have the ulterior motive of eliminating Special Forces?

Think about it!

1) In combat decision meetings, the SF guy is always at least one rank less than their guys. That is stacking the deck if ever there was such a thing.

2) They write enough vague guidelines that their Inspector Generals and JAG Officers can always attack SF even when the SF personnel are only the investigators of incidents, and the incident did not involve Special Forces personnel. This is a classic case of searching for the guilty so you can punish the innocent.

3) Special Forces Officers are precluded from testifying before The House Armed Services Committee, even when the subject is SF. That testimony was recently relegated to an Army 3-star who never spent a day in an SF unit. He testified about SF, rather than bring an SF Officer to the table.

This war was initiated by a congressional vote. It started out conventional then went unconventional. Yet our fully trained and combat experienced, active duty, Special Forces unconventional warfare experts are never questioned by the Congress that initiated the war. The result is our Representatives and Senators do not know what they do not know and that makes them dangerous. The results of that failure are something we all see.

Mike Linnane