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Quotes:
~ The point of all this is simple: Win. In warfare, nothing else matters.
If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win. Our victories are ultimately in humanity’s interests, while our failures nourish monsters.

~ Of all the enemies we face today and may face tomorrow, the most dangerous is our own wishful thinking.

Journal of International Security Affairs

WISHFUL THINKING AND INDECISIVE WARS

by Ralph Peters

The most troubling aspect of international security for the United States is not the killing power of our immediate enemies, which remains modest in historical terms, but our increasingly effete view of warfare. The greatest advantage our opponents enjoy is an uncompromising strength of will, their readiness to “pay any price and bear any burden” to hurt and humble us. As our enemies’ view of what is permissible in war expands apocalyptically, our self-limiting definitions of allowable targets and acceptable casualties hostile, civilian and our own continue to narrow fatefully. Our enemies cannot defeat us in direct confrontations, but we appear determined to defeat ourselves.

Much has been made over the past two decades of the emergence of “asymmetric warfare,” in which the ill-equipped confront the superbly armed by changing the rules of the battlefield. Yet, such irregular warfare is not new; it is warfare’s oldest form, the stone against the bronze-tipped spear and the crucial asymmetry does not lie in weaponry, but in moral courage. While our most resolute current enemies, Islamist extremists, may violate our conceptions of morality and ethics, they also are willing to sacrifice more, suffer more and kill more (even among their own kind) than we are. We become mired in the details of minor missteps, while fanatical holy warriors consecrate their lives to their ultimate vision. They live their cause, but we do not live ours. We have forgotten what warfare means and what it takes to win.

There are multiple reasons for this American amnesia about the cost of victory. First, we, the people, have lived in unprecedented safety for so long (despite the now-faded shock of September 11, 2001) that we simply do not feel endangered; rather, we sense that what nastiness there may be in the world will always occur elsewhere and need not disturb our lifestyles. We like the frisson (Latin/French: a sudden, passing sensation of excitement; a shudder of emotion; thrill ) of feeling a little guilt, but resent all calls to action that require sacrifice.

Second, collective memory has effectively erased the European-sponsored horrors of the last century; yesteryear’s “unthinkable” events have become, well, unthinkable. As someone born only seven years after the ovens of Auschwitz stopped smoking, I am stunned by the common notion, which prevails despite ample evidence to the contrary, that such horrors are impossible today.

Third, ending the draft resulted in a superb military, but an unknowing, detached population. The higher you go in our social caste system, the less grasp you find of the military’s complexity and the greater the expectation that, when employed, our armed forces should be able to fix things promptly and politely.

Fourth, an unholy alliance between the defense industry and academic theorists seduced decision makers with a false-messiah catechism of bloodless war. In pursuit of billions in profits, defense contractors made promises impossible to fulfill, while think tank scholars sought acclaim by designing warfare models that excited political leaders anxious to get off cheaply, but which left out factors such as the enemy, human psychology, and 5,000 years of precedents.

Fifth, we have become largely a white-collar, suburban society in which a child’s bloody nose is no longer a routine part of growing up, but grounds for a lawsuit; the privileged among us have lost the sense of grit in daily life. We grow up believing that safety from harm is a right that others are bound to respect as we do. Our rising generation of political leaders assumes that, if anyone wishes to do us harm, it must be the result of a misunderstanding that can be resolved by that lethal narcotic of the chattering classes, dialogue.

Last, but not least, history is no longer taught as a serious subject in America ’s schools. As a result, politicians lack perspective; journalists lack meaningful touchstones; and the average person’s sense of warfare has been redefined by media entertainments in which misery, if introduced, is brief.

By 1965, we had already forgotten what it took to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and the degeneration of our historical sense has continued to accelerate since then. More Americans died in one afternoon at Cold Harbor during our Civil War than died in six years in Iraq . Three times as many American troops fell during the morning of June 6, 1944, as have been lost in combat in over seven years in Afghanistan . Nonetheless, prize-hunting reporters insist that our losses in Iraq have been catastrophic, while those in Afghanistan are unreasonably high.

We have cheapened the idea of war. We have had wars on poverty, wars on drugs, wars on crime, economic warfare, ratings wars, campaign war chests, bride wars, and price wars in the retail sector. The problem, of course, is that none of these “wars” has anything to do with warfare as soldiers know it. Careless of language and anxious to dramatize our lives and careers, we have elevated policy initiatives, commercial spats and social rivalries to the level of humanity’s most complex, decisive and vital endeavor.

One of the many disheartening results of our willful ignorance has been well-intentioned, inane claims to the effect that “war doesn’t change anything” and that “war isn’t the answer,” that we all need to “give peace a chance.” Who among us would not love to live in such a splendid world? Unfortunately, the world in which we do live remains one in which war is the primary means of resolving humanity’s grandest disagreements, as well as supplying the answer to plenty of questions. As for giving peace a chance, the sentiment is nice, but it does not work when your self-appointed enemy wants to kill you. Gandhi’s campaign of non-violence (often quite violent in its reality) only worked because his opponent was willing to play along. Gandhi would not have survived very long in Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Russia , Mao’s (or today’s) China , Pol Pot’s Cambodia , or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq . Effective non-violence is contractual. Where the contract does not exist, Gandhi dies.

Furthermore, our expectations of war’s results have become absurd. Even the best wars do not yield perfect aftermaths. World War II changed the planet for the better, yet left the eastern half of Europe under Stalin’s yoke and opened the door for the Maoist takeover in China . Should we then declare it a failure and not worth fighting? Our Civil War preserved the Union and abolished slavery - worthy results, surely. Still, it took over a century for equality of opportunity for minorities to gain a firm footing. Should Lincoln have let the Confederacy go with slavery untouched, rather than choosing to fight? Expecting Iraq , Afghanistan or the conflict of tomorrow to end quickly, cleanly and neatly belongs to the realm of childhood fantasy, not human reality. Even the most successful war yields imperfect results. An insistence on prompt, ideal outcomes as the measure of victory guarantees the perception of defeat.

Consider the current bemoaning of a perceived “lack of progress” and “setbacks” in Afghanistan . A largely pre-medieval, ferociously xenophobic country that never enjoyed good government or a central power able to control all of its territory had become the hostage of a monstrous regime and a haven for terrorists. Today, Afghanistan has an elected government, feeble though it may be; for the first time in the region’s history, some of the local people welcome, and most tolerate, the presence of foreign troops; women are no longer stoned to death in sports stadiums for the edification of the masses; and the most inventive terrorists of our time have been driven into remote compounds and caves. We agonize (at least in the media) over the persistence of the Taliban, unwilling to recognize that the Taliban or a similar organization will always find a constituency in remote tribal valleys and among fanatics. If we set ourselves the goal of wiping out the Taliban, we will fail. Given a realistic mission of thrusting the Islamists to the extreme margins of society over decades, however, we can effect meaningful change (much as the Ku Klux Klan, whose following once numbered in the millions across our nation, has been reduced to a tiny club of grumps). Even now, we have already won in terms of the crucial question: Is Afghanistan a better place today for most Afghans, for the world and for us than it was on September 10, 2001? Why must we talk ourselves into defeat?

We have the power to win any war. Victory remains possible in every conflict we face today or that looms on the horizon. But, for now, we are unwilling to accept that war not only is, but must be, hell. Sadly, our enemies do not share our scruples.

The Present Foe

The willful ignorance within the American intelligentsia and in Washington , D.C. , does not stop with the mechanics and costs of warfare, but extends to a denial of the essential qualities of our most-determined enemies. While narco-guerrillas, tribal rebels or pirates may vex us, Islamist terrorists are opponents of a far more frightening quality. These fanatics do not yet pose an existential threat to the United States , but we must recognize the profound difference between secular groups fighting for power or wealth and men whose galvanizing dream is to destroy the West. When forced to assess the latter, we take the easy way out and focus on their current capabilities, although the key to understanding them is to study their ultimate goals no matter how absurd and unrealistic their ambitions may seem to us.

The problem is religion. Our Islamist enemies are inspired by it, while we are terrified even to talk about it. We are in the unique position of denying that our enemies know what they themselves are up to. They insist, publicly, that their goal is our destruction (or, in their mildest moods, our conversion) in their god’s name. We contort ourselves to insist that their religious rhetoric is all a sham, that they are merely cynics exploiting the superstitions of the masses. Setting aside the point that a devout believer can behave cynically in his mundane actions, our phony, one-dimensional analysis of al-Qaeda and its ilk has precious little to do with the nature of our enemies which we are desperate to deny and everything to do with us.

We have so oversold ourselves on the notion of respect for all religions (except, of course, Christianity and Judaism) that we insist that faith cannot be a cause of atrocious violence. The notion of killing to please a deity and further his perceived agenda is so unpleasant to us that we simply pretend it away. U.S. intelligence agencies and government departments go to absurd lengths, even in classified analyses, to avoid such basic terms as “Islamist terrorist.” Well, if your enemy is a terrorist and he professes to be an Islamist, it may be wise to take him at his word.

A paralyzing problem “inside the Beltway” is that our ruling class has been educated out of religious fervor. Even officials and bureaucrats who attend a church or synagogue each week no longer comprehend the life-shaking power of revelation, the transformative ecstasy of glimpsing the divine, or the exonerating communalism of living faith. Emotional displays of belief make the functional agnostic or social atheist nervous; he or she reacts with elitist disdain. Thus we insist, for our own comfort, that our enemies do not really mean what they profess, that they are as devoid of a transcendental sense of the universe as we are.

History parades no end of killers-for-god in front of us. The procession has lasted at least five thousand years. At various times, each major faith especially our inherently violent monotheist faiths has engaged in religious warfare and religious terrorism. When a struggling faith finds itself under the assault of a more powerful foreign belief system, it fights: Jews against Romans, Christians against Muslims, Muslims against Christians and Jews. When faiths feel threatened, externally or internally, they fight as long as they retain critical mass. Today the Judeo-Christian/post-belief world occupies the dominant strategic position, as it has, increasingly, for the last five centuries, its rise coinciding with Islam’s long descent into cultural darkness and civilizational impotence. Behind all its entertaining bravado, Islam is fighting for its life, for validation.

Islam, in other words, is on the ropes, despite no end of nonsense heralding “Eurabia” or other Muslim demographic conquests. If demography were all there was to it, China and India long since would have divided the world between them. Islam today is composed of over a billion essentially powerless human beings, many of them humiliated and furiously jealous. So Islam fights and will fight, within its meager-but-pesky capabilities. Operationally, it matters little that the failures of the Middle Eastern Islamic world are self-wrought, the disastrous results of the deterioration of a once-triumphant faith into a web of static cultures obsessed with behavior at the expense of achievement. The core world of Islam, stretching from Casablanca to the Hindu Kush , is not competitive in a single significant sphere of human endeavor (not even terrorism since, at present, we are terrorizing the terrorists). We are confronted with a historical anomaly, the public collapse of a once-great, still -proud civilization that, in the age of super-computers, cannot build a reliable automobile: enormous wealth has been squandered; human capital goes wasted; economies are dysfunctional; and the quality of life is barbaric. Those who once cowered at Islam’s greatness now rule the world. The roughly one-fifth of humanity that makes up the Muslim world lacks a single world-class university of its own. The resultant rage is immeasurable; jealousy may be the greatest unacknowledged strategic factor in the world today.

Embattled cultures dependably experience religious revivals: What does not work in this life will work in the next. All the deity in question asks is submission, sacrifice and action to validate faith. Unlike the terrorists of yesteryear, who sought to change the world and hoped to live to see it changed, today’s terrorists focus on god’s kingdom and regard death as a promotion. We struggle to explain suicide bombers in sociological terms, deciding that they are malleable and unhappy young people, psychologically vulnerable. But plenty of individuals in our own society are malleable, unhappy and unstable. Where are the Western atheist suicide bombers?

To make enduring progress against Islamist terrorists, we must begin by accepting that the terrorists are Islamists. And the use of the term “Islamist,” rather than “Islamic,” is vital not for reasons of political correctness, but because it connotes a severe deviation from what remains, for now, mainstream Islam. We face enemies who celebrate death and who revel in bloodshed. Islamist terrorists have a closer kinship with the blood cults of the pre-Islamic Middle East or even with the Aztecs than they do with the ghazis who exploded out of the Arabian desert , ablaze with a new faith. At a time when we should be asking painful questions about why the belief persists that gods want human blood, we insist on downplaying religion’s power and insisting that our new enemies are much the same as the old ones. It is as if we sought to analyze Hitler’s Germany without mentioning Nazis.

We will not even accept that the struggle between Islam and the West never ceased. Even after Islam’s superpower status collapsed, the European imperial era was bloodied by countless Muslim insurrections, and even the Cold War was punctuated with Islamist revivals and calls for jihad. The difference down the centuries was that, until recently, the West understood that this was a survival struggle and did what had to be done (the myth that insurgents of any kind usually win has no historical basis). Unfortunately for our delicate sensibilities, the age-old lesson of religion-fueled rebellions is that they must be put down with unsparing bloodshed, as the fanatic’s god is not interested in compromise solutions. The leading rebels or terrorists must be killed. We, on the contrary, want to make them our friends.

The paradox is that our humane approach to warfare results in unnecessary bloodshed. Had we been ruthless in the use of our overwhelming power in the early days of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq , the ultimate human toll on all sides would have been far lower. In warfare of every kind, there is an immutable law: If you are unwilling to pay the butcher’s bill up front, you will pay it with compound interest in the end. Iraq was not hard; we made it so. Likewise, had we not tried to do Afghanistan on the cheap, Osama bin Laden would be dead and al-Qaeda even weaker than it is today.

When the United States is forced to go to war-or decides to go to war-it must intend to win. That means that rather than setting civilian apparatchiks to calculate minimum force levels, we need to bring every possible resource to bear from the outset-an approach that saves blood and treasure in the long run. And we must stop obsessing about our minor sins. Warfare will never be clean, soldiers will always make mistakes, and rounds will always go astray, despite our conscientious safeguards and best intentions. Instead of agonizing over a fatal mistake made by a young Marine at a roadblock, we must return to the fundamental recognition that the greatest “war crime” the United States can commit is to lose.

Other Threats, New Dimensions

Within the defense community, another danger looms: the risk of preparing to re-fight the last war, or, in other words, assuming that our present struggles are the prototypes of our future ones. As someone who spent much of the 1990’s arguing that the U.S. armed forces needed to prepare for irregular warfare and urban combat, I now find myself required to remind my former peers in the military that we must remain reasonably prepared for traditional threats from states.

Yet another counter-historical assumption is that states have matured beyond fighting wars with each other, and that everyone would have too much to lose, that the inter-connected nature of trade makes full-scale conventional wars impossible. That is precisely the view that educated Europeans held in the first decade of the twentieth century. Even the youngish Winston Churchill, a veteran of multiple colonial conflicts, believed that general war between civilized states had become unthinkable. It had not.

Bearing in mind that, while neither party desires war, we could find ourselves tumbling, à la 1914, into a conflict with China , we need to remember that the apparent threat of the moment is not necessarily the deadly menace of tomorrow. It may not be China that challenges us, after all, but the unexpected rise of a dormant power. The precedent is there: in 1929, Germany had a playground military limited to 100,000 men. Ten years later, a re-armed Germany had embarked on the most destructive campaign of aggression in history, its killing power and savagery exceeding that of the Mongols. Without militarizing our economy (or indulging our unscrupulous defense industry), we must carry out rational modernization efforts within our conventional forces even as we march through a series of special-operations-intensive fights for which there is no end in sight. We do not need to bankrupt ourselves to do so, but must accept an era of hard choices, asking ourselves not which weapons we would like to have, but which are truly necessary.

Still, even should we make perfect acquisition decisions (an unlikely prospect, given the power of lobbyists and public relations firms serving the defense industry), that would not guarantee us victory or even a solid initial performance in a future conventional war. As with the struggle to drive terrorists into remote corners, we are limited less by our military capabilities than by our determination to pretend that war can be made innocently.

Whether faced with conventional or unconventional threats, the same deadly impulse is at work in our government and among the think tank astrologers who serve as its courtiers: An insistence on constantly narrowing the parameters of what is permissible in warfare. We are attempting to impose ever sterner restrictions on the conduct of war even as our enemies, immediate and potential, are exploring every possible means of expanding their conduct of conflicts into new realms of total war.

What is stunning about the United States is the fragility of our system. To strategically immobilize our military, you have only to successfully attack one link in the chain, our satellites. Our homeland’s complex infrastructure offers ever- increasing opportunities for disruption to enemies well aware that they cannot defeat our military head-on, but who hope to wage total war asymmetrically, leapfrogging over our ships and armored divisions to make daily life so miserable for Americans that we would quit the fight. No matter that even the gravest attacks upon our homeland might, instead, re-arouse the killer spirit among Americans-our enemies view the home front as our weak flank.

From what we know of emerging Chinese and Russian war fighting doctrine, both from their writings and their actions against third parties, their concept of the future battlefield is all-inclusive, even as we, for our part, long to isolate combatants in a post-modern version of a medieval joust. As just a few minor examples, consider Russia ’s and China‽ s use of cyber-attacks to punish and even paralyze other states. We are afraid to post dummy websites for information-warfare purposes, since we have talked ourselves into warfare-by-lawyers. Meanwhile, the Chinese routinely seek to infiltrate or attack Pentagon computer networks, while Russia paralyzed Estonia through a massive cyber-blitzkrieg just a couple of years ago. Our potential enemies believe that anything that might lead to victory is permissible. We are afraid that we might get sued.

Yet, even the Chinese and Russians do not have an apocalyptic vision of warfare. They want to survive and they would be willing to let us survive, if only on their terms. But religion-driven terrorists care not for this world and its glories. If the right Islamist terrorists acquired a usable nuclear weapon, they would not hesitate to employ it (the most bewildering security analysts are those who minimize the danger should Iran acquire nuclear weapons). The most impassioned extremists among our enemies not only have no qualms about the mass extermination of unbelievers, but would be delighted to offer their god rivers of the blood of less-devout Muslims. Our fiercest enemies are in love with death.

For our part, we truly think that our enemies are kidding, that we can negotiate with them, after all, if only we could figure out which toys they really want. They pray to their god for help in cutting our throats, and we want to chat.

The Killers Without Guns

While the essence of warfare never changes-it will always be about killing the enemy until he acquiesces in our desires or is exterminated-its topical manifestations evolve and its dimensions expand. Today, the United States and its allies will never face a lone enemy on the battlefield. There will always be a hostile third party in the fight, but one which we not only refrain from attacking but are hesitant to annoy: the media.

While this brief essay cannot undertake to analyze the psychological dysfunctions that lead many among the most privileged Westerners to attack their own civilization and those who defend it, we can acknowledge the overwhelming evidence that, to most media practitioners, our troops are always guilty (even if proven innocent), while our barbaric enemies are innocent (even if proven guilty). The phenomenon of Western and world journalists championing the “rights” and causes of blood-drenched butchers who, given the opportunity, would torture and slaughter them, disproves the notion were any additional proof required that human beings are rational creatures. Indeed, the passionate belief of so much of the intelligentsia that our civilization is evil and only the savage is noble looks rather like an anemic version of the self-delusions of the terrorists themselves. And, of course, there is a penalty for the intellectual’s dismissal of religion: humans need to believe in something greater than themselves, even if they have a degree from Harvard. Rejecting the god of their fathers, the neo-pagans who dominate the media serve as lackeys at the terrorists’ bloody altar.

Of course, the media have shaped the outcome of conflicts for centuries, from the European wars of religion through Vietnam . More recently, though, the media have determined the outcomes of conflicts. While journalists and editors ultimately failed to defeat the U.S. government in Iraq , video cameras and biased reporting guaranteed that Hezbollah would survive the 2006 war with Israel and, as of this writing, they appear to have saved Hamas from destruction in Gaza .

Pretending to be impartial, the self-segregating personalities drawn to media careers overwhelmingly take a side, and that side is rarely ours. Although it seems unthinkable now, future wars may require censorship, news blackouts and, ultimately, military attacks on the partisan media. Perceiving themselves as superior beings, journalists have positioned themselves as protected-species combatants. But freedom of the press stops when its abuse kills our soldiers and strengthens our enemies. Such a view arouses disdain today, but a media establishment that has forgotten any sense of sober patriotism may find that it has become tomorrow’s conventional wisdom.

The point of all this is simple: Win. In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win. Our victories are ultimately in humanity’s interests, while our failures nourish monsters.

In closing, we must dispose of one last mantra that has been too broadly and uncritically accepted: the nonsense that, if we win by fighting as fiercely as our enemies, we will “become just like them.” To convince Imperial Japan of its defeat, we not only had to fire-bomb Japanese cities, but drop two atomic bombs. Did we then become like the Japanese of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Did we subsequently invade other lands with the goal of permanent conquest, enslaving their populations? Did our destruction of German cities also necessary for victory turn us into Nazis? Of course, you can find a few campus leftists who think so, but they have yet to reveal the location of our death camps.

We may wish reality to be otherwise, but we must deal with it as we find it. And the reality of warfare is that it is the organized endeavor at which human beings excel. Only our ability to develop and maintain cities approaches warfare in its complexity. There is simply nothing that human collectives do better (or with more enthusiasm) than fight each other. Whether we seek explanations for human bloodlust in Darwin , in our religious texts (do start with the Book of Joshua), or among the sociologists who have done irreparable damage to the poor, we finally must accept empirical reality: at least a small minority of humanity longs to harm others. The violent, like the poor, will always be with us, and we must be willing to kill those who would kill others. At present, the American view of warfare has degenerated from science to a superstition in which we try to propitiate the gods with chants and dances. We need to regain a sense of the world’s reality.

Of all the enemies we face today and may face tomorrow, the most dangerous is our own wishful thinking.

[Ralph Peters is a retired U.S. Army officer, a strategist, an author, a journalist who has reported from various war zones, and a lifelong traveler. He is the author of 24 books, including Looking for Trouble: Adventures in a Broken World and the forthcoming The War after Armageddon, a novel set in the Levant after the nuclear destruction of Israel .]


Determining the Roles for General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Forces

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OUR MILITARY MUST END ONEUPSMANSHIP!

When I teach martial arts, my main concern is teaching my students how to protect themselves from attack, rape, kidnapping, or abuse, so consequently I teach very functional self-defense techniques, but I also believe they should become “martial artists” and not just “partial artists.” So, in that regard, when teaching aesthetic things such as kata (forms), I employ traditional forms which have been passed down from generation-to-generation with very little change. This balance of martial arts instruction is a microcosm of what also works in the real world.

For balance, we must have tradition in our lives, but we must also have a functional lifestyle. By that same regard, but on an even much higher plain, so does our military. The US military is full of great, rich tradition, but it is also the toughest most functional fighting force in the history of the world. That however may soon end, if we continue to eat our own young, and then we will not suffer defeat from an external enemy, but simply implode from within. What I propose transcends political parties, and it is neither conservative or liberal, republican or democratic. It is simply common sense, practical, and pro-American.

Politicians talk smack, but few, if any, have the actual courage and fortitude to say out loud what many of us will say privately, and what some of us think but do not verbalize. Right now our military tradition is far outweighing the functionality of our armed forces, which costs us billions, but more importantly it makes our military less efficient and consequently less powerful. By making the tough decisions to actually change, like so many politicians like to talk about but never really do; we can make a more cohesive, less costly, and much more functional fighting force than the world has ever seen, but without tossing our hallowed, rich, military tradition out the window. We simply need to overcome our own fear of change. With an upcoming Presidential and congressional election looming, I think it is time to present this very controversial but cost-saving and efficiency-producing solution to our military, which may make some people angry at me, but hopefully it will make some leaders think.

The general overview I suggest will shock and outrage some, but it is what will work. In the very broad look, here is my proposal in a nutshell:
  • 1. The US Army should be the one military fighting force that is in charge of and solely responsible for fighting on land.
  • 2. The US Navy should be the one military fighting force that is in charge of and solely responsible for fighting on water.
  • 3. The US Air Force should be the one military fighting force that is in charge of and solely responsible for fighting in the air.
That is the simple general solution, but let me get into more specifics before loading your firearm, donning your cammies, and looking for my house on Mapquest.

One of the main reasons I have been so proud that two of my sons followed my footsteps into the US Army Special Forces (the Green Berets) was because I naively thought that our military leadership had actually grown by lessons-learned from the Vietnam War, but we have not. We still make some errors in command.

We spend billions of dollars to train company grade officers (lieutenants and captains) and senior NCOs (Sergeants) how to properly deploy and protect troops in battle and accomplish unit missions, and then in the Global War On Terrorism, instead of trusting that small unit commander with “boots on the ground” and who knows the situation, we have “Chairborne-Rangers” sitting in air-conditioned offices and briefing rooms in places like MacDill AFB, the Pentagon, Qatar, Fort Bragg, Eglin AFB, and many higher headquarters all over the world micro-managing the war. That has previously been proven time and again to be a surefire formula for disaster in war, but nobody has the guts to tell flag officers, “Back off, General (or Admiral). Give a captain or a sergeant a job, and then do NOT tell them how to do it, especially when they, or their men and women, are the ones risking earning the Purple Heart (given for wounds or death), and they know the enemy situation on the ground.”

Now, with a Navy Admiral at the helm of the US Special Operations Command, the new big thing is MARSOC, the Marine Special Operations Command. After 50 years of the US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) learning more than any other fighting force about how to successfully conduct Unconventional Warfare, they now want the Marines to take over and do the same thing. This is after five decades of success by USA Special Forces, which has had its operators (Green Berets) learn to speak virtually every language in the world, the customs of every country, and of its indigenous citizens thereof. Befriending folks in remote villages all over the globe, learning how to infiltrate behind enemy lines and interact, co-exist, and actually train and equip those indigenous forces to fight their own battles, so United States troops do not have to be needlessly sacrificed fighting for those countries, Green Berets have become synonymous with successful Unconventional Warfare. Now, after 50 years of that great experience by the elite Special Forces, the US Marine Corps are being transformed to try to duplicate what Special Forces has done so successfully for decades. How ridiculous, arrogant, and short-sighted! I cannot believe the Pentagon has even allowed it to be a discussion let alone a reality.

Semper Fidelis! The US Marine Corps, I personally believe, has not only the coolest-looking dress uniforms of any of our armed forces, but also by far and away the very best esprit de corps. Marines have always been hard-charging, fire-breathing, butt-kicking, mission-accomplishing warriors, who distinguished themselves with a legacy of courage and honor in many wars at places like Tarawa, Bougainville, Iwo Jima, and beachheads all over the west and east. Do not think I want to do away with the Marine Corps. However, I suggest that we no longer attack on beaches with Navy ducks or other amphibious craft. That was in the distant past, and this is now. So what is the solution? I think the US Marine Corps is the finest infantry force in the world, but the US Navy, in my opinion, has zero business possessing their own army. The solution is very simple: The US Marine Corps stays the same but simply becomes a branch of the US Army. However, MARSOC, I propose, would be changed to what it actually should be for function: The only Special Operations mission the USMC should ever have is Direct Action, such as Force Recon or Sniper teams, but not UW, unconventional warfare.

Yes, I said it and many, many of us have whispered it for years, because it is efficient and common sense.

So let’s say we have made the USMC part of the Army, now what happens to the US Army Rangers? That is simple: It becomes a reinforcing direct action force for the US Army Special Forces, and the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force), which it is already doing effectively now. Ranger School can also specialize in Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) training and execution, which is what happened with the original Roger’s Rangers. No units will have LRRP members who have not first earned a Ranger tab.

Okay, Swabbies, I know. To be fair, the army has to lose something, right? Well, it’s not going to actually lose them, in my proposal, but just like the Navy, the US Army, US Navy, and US Marine Corps will turn over all of its aircraft to the US Air Force. Well, in actuality, all helicopter pilots on naval ships and with the US Army, including the USMC branch, will be part of and trained exclusively by the US Air Force, and then will be attached to Army or Navy units. No more naval and marine aviators or army chopper jockeys. They will all be US Air Force pilots, with both rotary and fixed wings. As mentioned earlier, the US Air Force will be in charge of the skies and any craft that goes into them. Naval aircraft mechanics will still be responsible for maintenance of craft and all flight deck operations, because they do operate on a ship. Likewise, helicopter and fixed wing army mechanics will maintain aircraft on the ground unless a USAF airbase is within close proximity, but all pilots and all aircraft will be USAF, attached to army and navy units.

So, now we might ask what about Navy Seals. Again, I believe that US Navy SEALs have indeed proven their worth and have a legacy of valor. But like the Marines and Rangers, they should only be used for direct action missions, but their missions should only be adjacent to or on the waterways of the world. They will still do the shore-launched sabotage missions, submarine lockout, many underwater missions. Like now, they will be like UDT (Underwater Demolition Teams) on steroids in a sense. The BUDS training qualification for SEALs should still be there to challenge young sailors to the maximum. Navy SEALs however, in my opinion, have no business fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan or sand-blown cities of Iraq, unless they are carrying out a mission on a seaport or coastline. The US Army Special Forces and 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force) would still use SCUBA and HALO-SCUBA infiltration methodology in lakes and rivers and on oceans only where a SEAL mission would not be applicable. In other words, if it is a UW mission that should only be performed by USASF or Delta Force, such as a hostage rescue on a cruise ship, then a SCUBA infiltration could be used where apropos.

Now, I have suggested taking from the Navy a bit herein, so what about adding to them? Fine, that is simple and common sense. Since it is dealing with oceans, seas, and other large waterways, it will also be efficient, and cost-effective for the US Coast Guard to become a branch of the US Navy. They are their own little Navy already, but would become part of the real deal, but their mission will not change.

Finally, to go into even more detail, the primary unit in the US Army Special Forces (the Green Berets) is the ODA, or 12-man Operational Detachment-A, often called “A-Teams.” It is commanded by a Captain, with a Warrant Officer as Executive Officer, or second-in-command, who come from SF NCOs who attend Warrant Officer school. This is good in that the XO has experience as a team non-com; however it hurts the US Army Special Forces significantly. One of the reasons I left the army as a young Captain was because my entire commissioned time as a Special Forces-qualified Infantry officer was spent serving in 4 Special Forces Groups, including the 5th Group in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969. I used to write suggestions and pass them up the chain of command and one suggestion, which many others wrote as well, was to make a new branch of the army called the Unconventional Warfare branch or Special Forces branch. Then it could attract young officers, like I was, who loved and believed in the role of Special Forces with a deep and abiding passion and could develop an entire career in that elite unit. In those days, with 4 SF Groups under my belt, my career was essentially ruined. I had become a “guerilla leader” in the minds of the brass; “too unconventional” was the term often used. Like in my day, and still to this day, conventional military commanders do not understand the US Army Special Forces, or there is professional jealousy, or both. We were and are the soldiers who were and are taught and encouraged to think outside the box and color outside the lines. When you get right down to brass tacks, conventional generals and admirals cannot easily control such men, so they want to destroy and develop something else that they can control. Brilliant! The same type of thinking had lines of British soldiers marching to drums towards our independent-minded fledgling continental army, which they killed by the thousands until we started thinking outside the box and actually won the Revolutionary War by shooting from ambush, firing from behind rocks and trees, and using hit and run tactics. The British commanders simply wanted to keep marching, halting, aiming, and firing on command. That, the protection of God, and our American fighting spirit were the primary reasons that the British sailed home, heads- hanging, and we became the United States of America.

A few years after I left the army, somebody actually thought and acted outside the bounds of military-thinking, and the branch like some of my contemporaries and superiors and I had proposed, the Unconventional Warfare Branch, was indeed created, but unfortunately we still have not learned, and it is now only a stop-off point for many young career captains. No longer are First Lieutenants ODA XO’s (Executive Officers) and Second Lieutenants ODA XO’s in-training. The USA Special Forces does not have 2nd or 1st Lieutenants anymore, none. You must be a captain to even try to qualify for Special Forces, but then after qualifying many captains try to do just one tour on an ODA. Not wanting to get stuck in staff jobs, they move on to other units such as the Rangers or airborne infantry outfits so they can still command troops and see action. Most of the good lieutenants who want to go to SF when they are promoted are simply kept with the conventional units where they have served. Worse yet, many young qualified men, like my sons, have no desire to go to Officers Candidate School (OCS) and become officers, because they cannot even get into Special Forces until they reach Captain, if they are even then allowed to go to Selection (SF qualification).

SF Warrant Officers can only become Chief Warrant Officers and can only make more money, but they can never become Captains or higher. They can never command ODA’s or go on to become majors, colonels, and so on. Utilizing the same theory as the SF warrant program, I strongly suggest changing the process, and experienced Special Forces NCOs can apply for a direct commission to First Lieutenant if they are a Sergeant First Class(SFC E7) or higher, and they become an ODA XO, eventually making captain and becoming an ODA commander. Additionally, experienced Special Forces Staff Sergeants (SSG E6) can apply to become second lieutenants. Or already commissioned second lieutenants can go through Special Forces qualification and continuous training like I did, to get them ready to become an A-team XO and eventually CO. This gives young leaders actual incentive. Higher pay is not an incentive to them; Having an opportunity to advance and take on greater challenge is. This will attract many more young officers to make a career out of Special Forces and not pursue command time in other units. It will also, like the current Warrant Officer program, afford Special Forces NCOs who wish greater advancement but actually keep being promoted to higher rank. Upon direct commission, the new officer will attend a short UW branch officers course. Current Special Forces Warrant Officers can also apply for commission to lieutenant and will be given priority.

At a higher command level, when I was in Special Forces, one problem was that senior SF officers had to deal with being the lowest rank there in command structure in theater during war. For example the head Green Beret in Vietnam, the 5th Special Forces Group commander, in charge of all A-Camps, special projects, and B and C team headquarters all over Vietnam was only a full colonel, while affiliated military divisions were being commanded by brigadier and major generals. I could not believe that still has not changed after all these years. I suggest that Special Forces Group command structure should change the TO and E (Tables of Organization and Equipment) so that Group commanding officers will be brigadier generals. Since a Special Forces battalion is much different than a conventional battalion, SF battalion commanders, under my proposal, will be full colonels, unlike the rank of lieutenant colonel now.

We are most definitely winning the Global War on Terrorism, and “the surge” has positively shown it is working much better than ever expected. We have the finest and toughest fighting force in the world, but the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have also shown us our weak areas where we can and should significantly improve. If US military command truly wants to improve, and if congress truly wants to cut costs, I hope someone will actually read this editorial and give it some thought. These are suggestions, not cast in concrete, but written in pencil so they can be revised and improved upon.

The problem with my proposal and what faces us, is two-fold: will professional jealousy, Pentagon politics, and competition between military branches eventually destroy us from within, or will we become smarter than that and learn it is also okay to shoot from behind trees and rocks, use hit and run tactics, and even let some of our elite troops color outside the lines.? The second question is: Aside from General Petraeus, do we still have any flag officers with the guts to think and act against the grain, or have so many of our senior leaders only developed the courage to speak out against their own chain of command on national politics because of a promised political position after retirement, then wonder why their own troops will not even follow them to the mess hall let alone to hell and back?

To me, a true warrior is willing to grow and innovate. The American fighting spirit and initiative that created Roger’s Rangers, defeated a much stronger, more highly-trained, and much larger army and navy that could only think and act the way it had previously performed . . . for centuries. It was not just our fighting spirit and valor, but by actually thinking and acting outside convention, that we became the United States of America and not South Canada, a proud but subservient British possession.

Don Bendell