Veterans of Special Forces

Responses

This response section is designed to provide a forum to comment on, add to, discuss and debate current questions and ideas. It is our intent to post all responses that address any side of a Special Forces issue. VSF reserves the right to delete responses that in our opinion are offensive. - VSF Editor

Question:

Do Multiple Definitions Of Unconventional Warfare preclude or enable confusion?
Click on Current Editorials from the main page and read - "Precluding Confusion - The Multiple Definitions Of Unconventional Warfare??"

    If Special Forces training is still following the doctrine set forth by Col Bank then the only way to save the Army Special Forces is to move them to the CIA, National Security Agency, or another entity, completely severing any ties with Army chain of command.
    It has been many years since I was actively involved with Special Forces and a person would think the jealousy would have gone away but it hasn’t. Commander eighteenth Airborne Corp refused to believe that Special Forces were not required to burn plywood, paint rocks, or stand on the parade field for hours rehearsing. When a person is promoted to General or Admiral they are knowledgeable in all fields, have the experience to command and profess they know where the rocks are. The same situation applies to SGM. It is not proper to ask a General if he has qualified with his issued 9mm. The truth of the matter is these people, just a few short months ago were issuing blankets, trucks, parts. bridges, or bullets. I can tell you now if the existing Special Forces do not develop their own chain of command and all the requirements thereto they are lost. They may as well disband now and open the club in Colon.
    I admire a person who has achieved the rank of General or Admiral, however Special Forces people should be experienced in all facets of the mission. If a person, regardless of rank, has no Special Forces experience they must be replaced. I wonder why there are so many more Generals now than in the second world war. Do we need all that guidance.
    Some time back Master Sergeants were recruited to become Team Sergeants. That program failed because being a Master Sgt does qualify you as a Special Forces Team Sergeant. Army Special Forces is a belief, similar to a religion, it is a way of life. Many soldiers went thru some hostile divorces because their wives could not understand this life. Sometimes it is difficult to tell your family you will be back in a few weeks, and have them understand. It’s tough to miss your sons baseball season, but it happens over and over.
        Respectfully Submitted
        A very old Team Sergeant.

Admiral Olson's statement is interesting. Where was the US Army when USSOCOM and USMC were developing the Irregular Warfare (IW) Concept?

If USSOCOM and USMC are so joined at the hip in Irregular Warfare, why does the US need both? USMC should be given the mission and USSOCOM should be deactivated.

USASOC could also be deactivated and both could be bill payers for US Army Special Forces Command which could then be given a primary mission to support the Country Teams with Security Assistance in the villages and neighborhoods of the world where the rubber is really going to meet the road and where the wars against insurgents will be won or lost.

This would also enable the US Army to regain focus on its primary mission to maintain a robust capability to win major wars.
SF 517

Are our Generals truly carrying the UW flag?
They were the ones(Dailey) who bad-mouthed SF/UW as a waste of money and men. His later apology rang hollow with me.
Mark

Problem is that they (MARSOC) are eating up funds, disproportionate to their strength. They are duplicating capability. SF is slowly ramping up--it takes about 7 yrs to grow a fully trained SF operator. This new USMC unit's plan is to rotate their people out after 5 yrs!!! The USMC is great at beach assault. They are far away from the shore in Iraq, but that is the history of warfare (use of units and people that they are not trained for). This is akin to giving the Army aircraft carriers. Remember when the Army had armed Mohawks and cargo carrying Caribou's?
Jackpv

Frankly, we have some aviator and Ranger Generals at SOCOM(Florida) who never did understand the concept or the value. They were too busy sending good men to court for not asking 'Mother may I?' before popping a terrorist.

As an SF Soldier and a Ranger their actions offend me. The Marines are merely stepping into a mission these fools detest. But even more despicable is the fact they seem to hate the great men who truly can perform them ('I want them shaved and in uniform'). They always have. Bad mistake. The USMC is infringing on SF missions.

Question:

Is Major General Gary Harrell's retirement an example of the glass ceiling?
See VSF position paper on the Main Page, titled "Glass Ceiling".

Absolutely!
anonymous by request

They just throw away the best and most dedicated soldiers they have ever had. In addition, the Navy wants the whole Special Forces Command for more stars with a body count and USD discard Special Forces as everyone knew. I see they piss on some fine mens graves in the process all for a power grab! I am glad i was just another Joe and like my whole family proud to have served. I would say good luck but, it appears that the screw tops have the attention of Gates and the President because this is not dis information. See you around campus and the food chain does still exist.

Bill Mc Keon
SOA 2586/SFA 1623

Question:

What is the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG)? What do they do?
Why has AWG recently been given the traditional SF mission of UW?
Reports indicates AWG is building 12-15 buildings at Camp Hill. For what purpose?

Wexford Group Helping US Asymmetric Warfare Group Settle In

Army To Create 'Asymmetric Warfare Group’ To Prepare For New Threats

The Asymmetric Warfare Group: Closing the Capability Gaps

Resolution - The TM stated that a resolution had been drafted in support of locating the Headquarters for the Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort A.P. Hill. The location of the Headquarters could generate up to 300 jobs at Fort A. P. Hill and that the Secretary of the Army would be making a decision regarding the location of the Headquarters in December. The Mayor stated that this matter came to their attention a couple of months ago when they had learned the proposed location would be at Fort Meade, Maryland. The Mayor stated that Senator Warner was aware of this decision, had sent a letter of support for the location of the unit at Fort A.P. Hill, and had questioned the reasoning for possible location at Fort Meade. Fort Meade has already secured benefits through the recent BRAC round in which three new units were located there which created 5,200 jobs. The resolution was sent out and Caroline County has drafted a similar resolution in support. Spotsylvania County will also draft a similar resolution in support of location of the Headquarters at Fort A.P. Hill. The Mayor stated that he thought bringing this unit to Fort A. P. Hill would support the Town of Bowling Green, Caroline County, and the surrounding area. The Mayor said that the Town appreciates the location of the base, tries to support Fort A. P. Hill, and tries to be conscientious when they are concerned about encroachment. The Mayor stated that he was very frustrated that Fort A. P. Hill was not considered when an opportunity like this could benefit the Town and surrounding area. The Mayor stated that this could be a very political decision and in discussions, he had been told that the decision might not be made in December. He stated that Governor Tim Kaine would become involved. Mr. Munson from Fort A.P. Hill was present and stated that Fort A. P. Hill did not have a position on the matter and appreciated the support of the Town. Mr. Munson stated that one of the major concerns for location of units in an area is the quality of life for the families in areas such as education, housing, etc. The TM stated that military personnel are very limited about what they can say about the issue and it is up to the Town to express support for this relocation. The TM stated that, in his opinion, the decision to locate the unit outside of Caroline County is based on misinformation, incorrect perception, and an unclear presentation of the facts relating to Bowling Green and Caroline County. He stated that it would be our job to make a clear presentation to decision makers regarding the placement of the unit at Fort A.P. Hill. The Mayor stated that a meeting had been requested with the Secretary of the Army who passed it down to General Hammond. Hopefully, this meeting will occur. On motion by Haley, seconded by Webb, Council voted to adopt the Resolution concerning the location of the Headquarters of the Asymmetric Warfare Group (ASWG) at Fort A.P. Hill. Voting Aye: McDearmon, Haley, Hinson, Ketterman, Webb, and Wright.
http://town.bowling-green.va.us/tcdecmin06.htm

For more information, visit AWG’s web site: http://www.awg.army.mil

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Asymmetric Warfare Group is a unit of the United States military created during the Global War on Terrorism to craft doctrine for asymmetric warfare. The unit is stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland and is not associated with Special Operations Forces.

Mission Statement
The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) is the Army’s new rapid deployable unit. The AWG is a Special Missions Unit organized to conduct continuous and simultaneous operations throughout the world to defeat specified asymmetric threats against the United States. Simply put, the AWG is the US expert in asymmetric warfare.

Key Tasks
-Serve as the global conventional U.S. Army expert in asymmetric warfare
-Deploy, integrate, coordinate and execute battle command of AWG trained and ready forces
-Assist in identification, development, and integration of countermeasure technologies
-Establish linkages with all internal, combatant command, and national intelligence agencies
-Analyze asymmetric threats -Observe, collect, develop, validate, and disseminate emerging TTPs
-Support JTF (Joint-task Force) commanders and units in countering AW threats

History
The AWG traces its origin to the 2003 Army Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force. The Army G3 directed the establishment of the Asymmetric Warfare Regiment (AWR) in June 2004. The AWR eventually changed its title to Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG).

Mission
The AWG conducts operational advisory assistance to Army and Joint Force Commanders enabling them to identify and close capability gaps, enhance training, and exploit enemy vulnerabilities in order to mitigate and defeat Asymmetric threats and help form a mentally agile and adaptive Army culture.

It appears that Special Forces is being surrounded from without and within by elements of the several Services that are at the same time complaining that they are already "overcommitted" in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also appears that the old solution of "Form another Headquarters" is alive and well in spite of repeated past failures.
Jim Bolan

Question:

Is it true that members of the 1st Special Forces Group Airborne on Okinawa are restricted to base
    indefinitely?
Is it true that USMC LTG Zilner has imposed this restriction on Marines and Special Forces personnel
    because of charges of misconduct by two marines in an incident not involving SF personnel?
Is it true that Special Forces personnel need a waiver from an O-6 to leave their Okinawa base?
Is it true that the highest ranking Special Forces Officer on Okinawa is an O-5, which means the
    Special Forces chain of command has no authority to waive this infringement on Special Forces
    personnel?

It's true. In fact, until further notice, all SOFA status personnel including civilians on Okinawa are restricted to on base facilities or their homes off base. No shopping, eating, visiting friends off base, etc. Exceptions are to go medical/dental appointment, education, pay bills. Retirees are not included if not working for US Gov/SOFA status.
~ Roland Nuqui

We hung Saddam Hussein for punishing innocent men, women and children.
~ received telephonically

"Oppressed in Okinawa"

Well thank God my husband is retired and we are not stationed in Okinawa!
It seems "ironic" that the SF Motto is "De Oppresso Libre" (Free the Oppressed) and here we have a whole SF Forward Bn (with family members) that are being held hostage because the "Marines" can't behave on land (maybe they should just stay on a boat).

Not only that, but does the US have a trade embargo with Okinawa? What a way to "win the hearts and minds" of the Okinawans by imposing trade sanctions.

My friend sent me the information in which they can't go shop off base or go to restaurants, etc. Here is the funniest portion of the Q&A: If you live off base, you can take your dog out to do its "business" but you must return immediately to your quarters.

Sounds like prison camp to me (but you gotta pay rent if you live off base)!

D. Carey (Happy to be in the USA)
Spouse of Retired SF NCO

Question:

Is it true that USAJFKSWC&S is not listed as a school on the TRADOC web site? If not, why not?

Why would USSOCOM attempt to duplicate, at a cost of almost $2 Billion, the Special Forces mission capabilities that have been developed over five decades by ... and are now being taught at ... the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School?

Why is it important to create and fund an essentially competitive and duplicative organization that will take many years of understudy only to replace the Special Forces capabilities we have today?

"SF would benefit by having an influx of well trained, highly motivated and well conditioned personnel. This would be a "win-win" scenario for both services. Of course, this is a very unlikely scenario." -Rick Stone

Gentlemen, this is the best scenario that I have read lately to the turmoil our industry is going through. All we need is someone in the high echelon of the chain to sell the idea to those who want to waste billions of dollars to create a duplicity of what already exists.

My oldest one, Mike aka Rudy, spent his last five years teaching HALO. He commented that during his tour there all branches of the services that had the personnel who used HALO as a method of insertion attended the school at Fort Bragg. The method of madness in this day and age are not known, however, having spent numerous years teaching various subjects at SFTG, and Group prior to SFTG I offer the following:
+Use the funds required to establish another school in Unconventional Warfare specifically Special Operations to train selected USMC personnel at Fort Bragg.
+Train these selected individuals in the SF methods of UW, SO, and methods of infiltration. This is inclusive of MR, MFR, AAFP, and SEALS.
+This method of instruction would teach these selected Non-Commissioned Officers, Officers, and any other qualified selected persons worthy of becoming the Best of the Best.
+Maybe upon returning to the ranks from which they emanated these persons would be able to teach their own in the art of surreptitiously entering places of denial without kicking doors in thus becoming more professional, sincere, and dedicated to Professionalism.
+ADVANTAGES are consolidation of funds ~ Everyone working off the same page when on joint operations ~ Elimination of any duplication of efforts.

Respectfully Submitted,
®

Gentlemen,
I deeply respect your concern for the future of Special Forces, which currently is THE most valuable asset the US have for the GWOT.

On the other hand it can be argued that SF is more in danger from "door kicking" lovers in USSOCOM and the other services, than from the standing up of MARSOC.

It seems the only way to "grow" more SOF forces, without lowering the standards is to tap a new manpower pool. The only one available (and a good one at that) was the USMC, which remained outside USSOCOM all these years.

It is also obvious that USSOCOM wants them on the UW/FID path. That’s were the real personnel "gaps" are, and that’s were SF enjoy a relative "monopoly" if you excuse the expression.

But you can’t expect the USMC to give up some of their best men by allowing them to go through the SF pipeline. By the end of it (about 48 weeks excluding schools like ABN) they will probably be more "SF" than "Marines". Even more, you cannot expect them to join SF ranks.

We all know, the "once a Marine always a Marine" motto the Corps likes so much, and rightly so.

All in all, I imagine that you will have to live with a duplication of capabilities. There seems to be no way around it. Manpower is all important under the circumstances.

It would probably be better to quit criticizing the new MARSOC, (which makes third parties think you just want a "monopoly" of capabilities) and concentrate your efforts in the establishment of a JOINT (not just Army) Unconventional Warfare command, alongside JSOC.

It sounds right making an issue about not many Generals from SF getting over the rank of MG. This is very suspicious indeed.

With Respect
George Papanikolaou
Athens Greece

I have just finished reading all the articles about the USMC buildup and the seeming demise of SF in our future military structure. The authors are unfortunately correct in their recognition that only SF has adopted/adhered to the "quiet professional" methodology. It has undoubtedly and unfortunately resulted in us becoming an unknown, and forgotten force. I have heard throughout the 70's and 80's, and during the first Gulf War to present, the all too familiary "we don't discuss Special Forces/Operations" from all the official military and civil commentators to the news media. While all the time, all you see in every aspect of media is the perpetual and often times childish pronouncements and promotions of NAVY SEALS. Aren't we all sick of the "SEAL push up tapes, workout tapes, even SEAL underoos and video games....gag) It has become for many decades now the largest yet most respectfully whispered joke among the SF community, that the legend that has been created was simply and exclusively created by "the teams" themselves, certainly not from any real accomplishments in comparison to the rest of the SOF world. The USMC has likewise developed one of the most effecting lobbying blocks imaginable in and around the District. Our adherence to being quiet professionals, gentlemen, and with little doubt more professional in some ways than the rest of SOF, has led us to this point where our very existence could become an issue. Upon my own retirement I worked as an independent contractor for both the U.S. Government as well as several of the manpower providers (in 41 countries) doing highly classified work abroad, and have been often amazed at the discussions between former SOF operators about the capabilities and superiority in some ways of both the SEAL teams and the USMC "newcomers". I seldom here about SF, even though many of them are present, and have wondered why, and to put it bluntly the reason is because we have been trained, and conditioned to keep our mouths shut, even though we often see where it is taking us and with little awareness of our own leadership and that of the civil leadership at the national level. To end, I wholly support the effort to simply tell the truth, and tell it often and loudly that SF is an established, esperienced and highly successful force for today and the future, and perhaps it's time to lose some of our humility which just might save SF for tomorrow.

Respectfully submitted,
JB.

That my friend is the $100,000.00 QUESTION!!! WHY? Because some puke in the system got his fingers burned, or had a case of (deleted) for brains, and couldn't see the light of day before saying: "Hey, we don't need those guys any more.

Why? Because some damn Jarhead General Officer wants "his boys" to run all ground operations against the enemy

Why? Because someone, two, three, or even more Special Forces General Officers didn't intervene and run advance recon to determine the extent of the "wants" out there for former SF types. I cannot truly visualize any SF Officer conducting such an in-house operation. Has our own given up on our activities and work with the State House/Congress. In fact, I think I must forewarn you all that when they spiced up a Mickey Mouse for the young chauffeur to take a break. Personally, I think some of the conventional forces are up in arms with the SF type and are pretty much involved in completely wiping out the ranks and dispatching them in fact to various conventional organizations for the use to the over all commander of the total organization.

Regards...............Ringland

Question:

Is It True?

Is it true that Special Forces currently has a total of 378 (12 man) ODAs (270 active and 108 National Guard) and MARSOC will have 24 (14 man) MSOTs?

Is it true that Special Forces executes approximately 40% of the deployed man-days in USSOCOM?

Is it true that Special Forces receives less than 10% of USSOCOM's known funding?

Is it true that last year, the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School graduated 942 Green Berets (over 80% of whom will become career soldiers in Army Special Forces), enough to fill 78 (12 man) ODAs at a cost of $130 million?

Is it true that USSOCOM approved of MARSOC receiving nearly $2 billion to organize itself and build a school to create 24 (14 man) Marine Special Operations Teams, all of whom are on short-term assignment to MARSOC and will need to be replaced every 3-5 years as they return to regular USMC duties?

Is it true that your Congressman does not know these questions yet, and certainly not the answers?

VSF Editor's Comment RE: USMC Major Raney's rebuttal posted below:

We find no evidence of disrespect of the USMC in General Guest's remarks. Marines were spoken of with admiration in what they are trained and equipped to do. We are grateful for every US Marine's efforts to defend America.

We agree the USMC is the premier expeditionary raiding force. We know marines were conducting successful raids for 200 years before the founding of USASOC and that was when America was still winning wars. Given all available resources, America expects the USMC to excel at direct action missions. Special Forces is the only US Armed Forces unit that can perform every USSOCOM mission. We witnessed USMC CMDT General Conway explain on C-Span (Dec 2007) that the reason he founded MARSOC was to disrupt the transfer of USMC NCOs to Special Forces.

Request Major Raney inform those outstanding Marine NCO's, who still wish to become true masters of the art, that the door to join Special Forces is still open.

(The following informtion was submitted By - USMC Major Mark Raney)
Rebuttal to "Can a Leapord Change his Spots Editorial" MG Guest (Ret)

The contents of this writing is strictly an opinion piece and the personal views of the Author and are his alone, and are not to be taken as opinions or policy of the United States Marine Corps, MARSOC and/or any entity mentioned in the piece, especially Jeremiah.

The Introduction

The typical objective reader would not give such an emotive and one-sided rant a thought and certainly, the same reader would not egregiously slip and give the editorial credence by penning even a quick rebuttal. Conversely as an Officer, there is an obligation to answer this editorial. The General’s s sense of history is somewhat distorted. One can trace the heritage of MARSOC’s spirit to April 27, 1805, all the way back to the Shores of Tripoli, where Marine Lt. Presley N. O'Bannon led a force of Marines and indigenous personnel across 600 miles of Libyan Desert to attack the fortress at Derna, Tripoli. Does it sound familiar? That is right the Marine Corps in 1805, in a simplistic view, conducted effectively the present day definition of Unconventional Warfare (UW) as directed by the President of the United States, in order to carry out foreign policy in the interest of National Security. This demonstrates; FID/UW is nothing new and it is deeply rooted in the Marine Corps’ history, from the China to the Banana Wars of Haiti and Cuba, to the Combined Action Teams of Vietnam, and certainly today in places like Africa, Middle East, and Europe.

The Idiom

Can the leopard change his spots? This idiom is historically thought to have been penned first by the Hebrew prophet Jeremiah in the year 700BC and of course it can be found today in the Old Testament (Jer 13:23) and thus it should be correctly referenced and applied. Because of it being an idiom and all too often many readers will mistakenly interpret idioms at face value, but that is the nature of an idiom, one cannot extrapolate the meaning by a simply reading it. This is also, where I find fault in the General’s argument and emphatically his final statement. In the leopard idiom, it is suggesting the leopard cannot change his spots and neither can the shepherdess of her sin. The Leopard idiom is similar in meaning to that of the more contemporary idiom “you cannot teach an old dog a new trick” and this reader has taken from the General’s editorial, it is obvious the old dog idiom is a truth rather than an idiom. More apropos to the General’s opinion is Rudyard Kipling’s, “How the Leopard got his Spots.” Kipling wrote a somewhat satirical work, meaning to invoke the reader to view that change is not only inevitable but also necessary for survival.

The Incapacitated

However, from the metaphorical rocking chair of retirement, the General has opined from either misinformation or is just relying heavily on information, garnered through a snapshot view of web pages. As a result, the editorial is an expected shortsighted view from the old guard view of the present and the future of the United States Military as a whole. Regrettably, the web pages of which are referenced are at best a simplistic summary of the newest component in USSOCOM. Moreover, the web pages are simplistic and not intended to defend the existence, necessity, and operations of the MARSOC. As in the misinterpretation of the idiom I argue that the General takes an emotional and closely personal subject and attempts to provide to his limited audience a justification to denigrate the Marine Corps, MARSOC and to some extent any military member. The individual Soldier, Airman, Sailor, and Marine is mentioned because the General clearly question’s every servicememember’s courage, vision, commitment and sacrifice, and paints them as trifle buffoons by stating the SF-Green Beret is trained better. One can argue that the SF Soldier is special because of the training, as the General alludes to through his recounting of their training pipeline. However, a great number of phenomenal military service members regrettably are never afforded the opportunity to attempt a career as an SF Soldier.

The Interviews

In the editorial, there is a noticeable absence of primary source information and a lot of conjecture. There is absolutely no mention of the General visiting the forces in the field to observe units training or while operating. There is no mention meeting with anyone in MARSOC, the Marine Corps, Department of the Navy and no reference from a single TSOC, CJSOTF Commander working with MARSOC, some for years now. There is no mention of speaking with the plank holding Commander at MARSOC, Major General Hejlik. Whom should prove easily accessible to any of his peers that comes with such an objective and deep concern for the future of Special Forces and the MARSOC’ warriors lack of courage, training, history, mindset, and of course Major General Hejlik’s inability to get it right the first time. Surely no unit has ever reorganized to find efficiencies before the MARSOC’s. Moreover, they can discuss the gross negligence, poor judgments and decision making that is clearly been demonstrated by former Secretary of Defense and the rest of those that have made such a grave error in judgment and decision making in creating, funding and MARSOC. This if of course my answer to his attempt at humor.

The Inequality

Simply put the editorial is not a holistic review, comparison, and contrast of the details of funding between MARSOC and the other USSOCOM Service Components. What are the funds mentioned? The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) controls through his Title 10 functions and funds them accordingly as the Marine Corps’ lead General. To ensure the readers understand this funding, and that the CMC is responsible for distributing these funds to cover a multitude of concepts and programs throughout the Marine Corps, not just MARSOC i.e., funding the MRAP Vehicle program for the Marines and Sailors in Iraq. The correlation between the CMC and his Title X funding functions is important because the General’s editorial point means to state emphatically and dramatically a degree of imbalance and seemingly unfair distribution of funding of other military forces leaving the highly trained, mature, and capable Special Forces to be in want. Of course, in the editorial there is no direct comparison and contrast between the Army and the Marine Corps total Title 10 function and of the obviously absent consideration of the distribution of MFP-11 funding by USSOCOM to the service components. I do concede to not having the full wherewithal and capacity to know the full distribution of funding for the Marine Corps component and MARSOC. Nevertheless, to take a chance to explain away this disparity in distribution I would first say the editorial is comparing apples to oranges (MARSOC a component and SF a Branch of a component). Secondly, if you insist on comparing the two my speculation or logic to the budget differences; you have had several decades at USASOC and SF and have established the best screening, assessment and selection processes, facilities, training areas, scenarios and ranges, education facilities, equipment and to a greater degree established efficiencies the Marine Corps doesn’t yet possess. This point should also resonate for the SF community a success and something you should celebrate as your legacy to the American People, and in the General’s assessment, you are creating the best soldiers in the world and doing it for less.

The Information

The editorial is also remiss in mentioning the plan to plus up each of the SF groups with a new Battalion in the coming years which I will hypothesize (guess) a sum total will be more than 4 times the total operators than in the MARSOC Component.. This may be because instead of having a true discussion on the subject the opinions offered in the editorial have little substance, are riddled emotion and sophomoric service-centric humor and certainly offers no feasible recommendations for the reader to want to petition on the General’s and SF communities’ behalf. The greatest fault of this editorial is it is remiss in defining why MARSOC cannot do the FID/UW mission. The editorial only states SF-Green Berets can and no one argues that point. In fact, they have been, are, and will be the premier UW/FID Force. Additionally, no one will argue the SF Operators in USSOCOM get limited platitudes and recognition for their extreme efforts and even more astonishing accomplishments. That is the nature of the business.

The SF-Green Berets are out doing their nation’s bidding, and doing it with the utmost professionalism, but the General knows the SF Community is stretched to their fullest operational tempo. Already limited on time between deployments, and as the nature of the current conflict has it, you cannot be strong everywhere, but even the lowest of priority phase zero countries going unattended, would have negative impacts from a lack of persistent engagements. To create SOF operator equal to a SF-Green Beret takes a lot, but you can offer up forces to provide reprieve to the ever increasing demand on their the superior skill set.

As the General mentioned, the establishment of MARSOC was directive in nature and until it is directed to stand down, every Commander of MARSOC will intend for his force to be the best at what they do. No one wins if they half step into the mission. Will the MARSOC’s MSOAG be an equal to an SF Group tomorrow? No! Therefore, in planning of our engagements where FID missions we must develop courses of action with the correct forces and apply the best units and to the highest priority countries where failure of mission or the intricacy of the mission is such the other unit is not capable or vailable. As MARSOC wrestles with what it is, what it will be, and with so many of the SF engaged in OEF/OIF we all have to conclude that by MARSOC conducting persistent engagment along the indirect lines of operations throughout the globe, is currently good for the nation.

Mark Raney (Major USMC)

My perspective on this issue is somewhat different than yours, though my conclusion is the same that most of you have reached. In addition to being a Life member of SFA, I am also a member of Force Recon Assn. and 2d Recon Bn. Assn. I served in the Marine Corps 1974-78, including B co. 2d Recon Bn., then again in 3d Force Recon Co., USMCR 1986-88 as a MSGT. I served in SF as an 18B,18C, 18D from 1978-86 and represented 2/20th SFGA at the CMF 18 Conference in Dec. 1983. Thus, I am able to look at this issue from both sides. Having proudly served as a Recon Marine, I intimately know the mission, capabilities, training and quality of the “product” produced by Marine Recon. Marine Recon and Force Recon’s missions are to be the “eyes and ears” of the Division and FMF Commanders, as well as to be prepared to conduct DA, HRT, and CT missions. They do so and do it well. However, as stated by Larry Bailey, since Gen. Gray’s tenure as Commandant, the Marine Corps has moved more in the direction of becoming a Special Operations type unit. With the advent of the Special Operations Capable Marine Amphibious Unit program (SOC-MAU), the Corps started it’s movement to today’s end point. Reconnaissance has been farmed out to sensors, drones, aerial and satellite recon. The regular Infantry Bns. training has been ramped up to cover the DA, HR, and CT missions. Now with the formation of MARSOC, the Force Recon Co.s are being deactivated. The men in the remaining Force Recon Co.s are having a difficult time getting Dive school, Ranger school, HALO slots because they are being sucked up by MARSOC. The Corps’ reconnaissance capabilities are being minimized. The Recon Marines are not as well trained as they should be to accomplish the missions that they will soon be buried in, due to the reduction in number of qualified Marines. The Corps is also skimming the cream of the crop from its Recon units to form MARSOC. Particularly among the NCO and Staff NCO ranks. I cannot fault the Marine Corps for being innovative and trying to remain an indispensible fighting force. I do not agree that the path it should take is the MARSOC path. That wheel has already been invented and pretty much perfected. The last 50 plus years of development that SF has gone through cannot be recreated over night. It certainly should not be done to the detriment of one of the Marine Corps’ greatest asset and capability. If the Corps wants a MARSOC type presence, this is how it should be done, in my opinion. It should send Marine NCOs to SFQC early in their careers then “second” them to SFGA’s for 3-4 years. At the end of that time, return them to Recon units. The Marines would return better trained, more experienced, and will have developed contacts in a sister service and several host countries’ armed forces. SF would benefit by having an influx of well trained, highly motivated and well conditioned personnel. This would be a “win-win” scenario for both services. Of course, this is a very unlikely scenario.

Semper Fidelis,
Rick Stone

The Marines Force Reconnaissance Units are trained to replicate the Ranger type missions and are very good in that respect. Now to give them the same missions as that given to a Special Forces Unit, is way out of proportion. First of all, they have to duplicate the training that is being conducted at the Special Warfare Center, to be considered qualifying in the Special Forces environment and it's missions. Language Training for the various countries that are targeted for the missions is another consideration to look at, not to mention the Special Insertion Methods that have to be taken by a very selective group of Operatives to accomplish missions deep behind enemy lines. DA, FID, SR, and all of the other Special Missions that are ususlly given to Rangers, Seals, and all of the other members of Special Operations Forces to include MARSOC, are in keeping with the SOF Tradition of accomplishing missions throughout the Theaters of Operations. But, when it comes to Unconventional Warfare, this should be considered as a very high and sensitive matter that should only be given to the Unit most qualified and that is no one else but Special Forces Units that are Trained there at FT. Bragg, NC, Special Warfare Center. So, if you asked me how I feel about the move to Specialize the Marines in this respect, then let them go through the same training by beefing up the funds at the Special Warfare Center, and have them send their best selected personnel to go through the selection process there at Camp Mckall, and upon successful complition of the Selection Process, then and only then will they be allowed to go through the Qualification Course, and upon completion of the Q-Course, then they can be sent back to their respective Marines Special Operations Unit and be recognized as a member of the Special Forces Unit that they want to have. For the Marines to come up with their own Training Facility, they still have to have our curriculum for their training, as well as the instructors that are qualified to teach the course. This will require a lot of monies, time and effort, and a complete redundancy on the Government's part. It just doesn't make sense!!

Tony Aquiningoc
SGM Retired Special Forces

Dear Comrades-in-Arms;

I applaud your efforts to re-awaken DoD, the Army, Congress, the Administration, and the American public about the indispensable function and unsurpassed capabilities of the United States Army Special Forces. There is no question that without your admirable efforts, SF will unnecessarily wither and die. As a member of the brotherhood, I humbly offer a couple of observations I hope you will find useful:

1. Indeed, Special Forces "seniors" must to get out front with the press and use publicity to advance the SF cause. It is truly regrettable that in the early 1980s a decision was made to eliminate the SF Gabriel Detachment so that the 5th SFGA could regain operational control of its two ODAs that were chopped to the then 1st SOCOM. As a detachment commander of that team, my men and I made significant contributions to the command's public relations efforts. Well written articles about SF with photos in Parade Magazine, US News and World Report and Newsweek heralded the return of the Green Berets! SF had gone nowhere but the 1st SOCOM Public Affairs office skillfully used the Gabriel Detachment as a vehicle to promote a new awareness of SF. The detachment made hundreds of appearances at large public events -- we marched down 5th Avenue in New York City on Armed Forces Day in 1982; appeared at the International Boy Scout Jamboree at Fort AP Hill; and visited more high schools, and state and county fairs than I can count. Since the late 1960s, the SF community never came close to achieving a level of public awareness provided by the Gabriel Detachment in the early 1980s until the 5th SFG entered Afghanistan in 2001. Since 2002, when "big Army" entered the picture in Afghanistan followed by the invasion of Iraq, SF successes have been sidelined in favor of the exploits of non-SF SOF units and the conventional force. Clearly, it is imperative to protect the identities of currently serving SF soldiers at the Battalion Command level and below. Once an officer is selected for Group Command and higher level senior SF leadership positions, however, one of their key missions must be to aggressively promote SF within the Armed Forces, to members of congress, and to the American public. Most importantly, they need to make a distinction between the acronyms "SF" and "SOF". Many seniors within the conventional force and the SOF community have skillfully blurred the distinction between the two.

2. Many valuable writings that have appeared recently about SF successes in Afghanistan and Iraq were published in a backwater publication: "The Drop". This is not to criticize our Association or its fine membership magazine but articles in "The Drop" preach to the choir and accomplish little else. Alternatively, stories documenting the battlefield successes of our ODAs need to appear with regularity in Time, Newsweek and other mainstream press publications.

3. MG Guest's recent article in "The Drop" should serve as a battle cry for our alumni to rise to the occasion in support of today's SF warriors. Indeed, Vietnam was a glorious period for SF and that legacy must be preserved. Early in my SF career, a small number of Lodge Act soldiers were still on active duty. The "Veterans of Special Forces" organization should promote the notion of a modern day Lodge Act for a select group of vetted veterans of the Nicaraguan Contras, the Kurdish Peshmerga of Northern Iraq, and the Pashtun freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Like their SF counterparts, members of those groups fought and died for the United States as much as they did for their own country. Limit the quotas to several thousand of our most trusted and deserving surrogates with the clear understanding that they receive US citizenship only after successfully complete Army basic training and AIT, airborne training, and SFQC followed by three years of honorable service in an SFGA.

4. Corporate outreach. Your organization should give serious thought to partnering with "deep pocket" corporate sponsors. You will need a lot of money and the influence that comes with it to achieve your mission and goals.

5. The "Veterans of Special Forces" is retired General Officer and Sergeant Major "heavy". Be careful not to be exclusionary. For many years in the late 1970s and 1980s, the SFA was "Vietnam Veteran" centric and the views of younger members like me were not welcome. Embarce and exploit offerings by the new generation of SFers!

6. And finally, don't complain about what should or could be. Take positive action and be constructive. Like the old song goes, "Accentuate the positive, eliminate the negative, latch on to the affirmative, and watch out for Mr. Inbetween"!

Good luck!

De Oppresso Liber,
George Johnson, COL, USAR

Question:

Does the decision by US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to task Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) with the missions of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Counter Terrorism (CT), and Information Operations (IO) create a duplicative capability or a redundant capability within USSOCOM and by extension, USASOC and USASFC?

Tony Aquiningoc
SGM Retired Special Forces

Q: Does tasking MARSOC with FID, DA, SR, UW, CT, and IO create a duplicative capability or a redundant capability within USSOCOM and by extension, USASOC and USASFC?

A: Yes, and no. My answer is not directed to any parochial turf war. MARSOC by training, and temperament, is not qualified to effectively conduct FID, UW, and IO. I can see a colorable argument being made that they could conduct DA, SR, and CT. One example to buttress their claim would be that the USMC has been conducting Direct Action missions since its inception at Tun Tavern. Historically, that is true. A less persuasive position for Special Reconnaissance might be put forward based on the historical example of Marine Raider units from WW II that had the mission, "to conduct amphibious light infantry warfare, particularly in landing in rubber boats and operating behind the lines."

Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, and Information Operations units all require extensive training, and experience, which cannot be stood-up overnight. The resources to support such strengths and skills should be dedicated to the USSOCOM forces tasked to conduct such operations, which are organized and assigned to USASFC. The present alignment, with the possible exceptions of DA and SR, has greater efficacy, and would represent a huge savings to our taxpayers.

Very respectfully, I remain at your service...

sine pari,
George P. Farris

Dear Comrades-in-Arms;

Good luck!
De Opresso Libre,
George Johnson, COL, USAR

TEAM,

This is an important issue. I have been following Mike's passion to keep this in the news. We all know how the services try to maneuver and enhance their capabilities to become invaluable to the US Government, to hell with what other service has the current capability and capacity. (i.e. AIR assets and capabilities vs. Navy, Air Force, Marines and even Army)

In this time of WAR, and with the difficulty to FUND anything with the negative focus by some in US Government, I feel MIKE has a very valid opinion here. (WHY--you already have Special Forces??? WHY the redundancy??? If you feel it is important to expand SOF then give them a separate mission like you did the Air Force and Navy...

John (With an inquiring mind) Let SFA National know if you have an opinion. This is something that would be important to articulate in the DROP...I have not read anything from National. Correct me if I am wrong...

John E. Cleckner Sr.
USSF Retired
Redding, CA

Well written and I completely concur. Of course you are directly attacking some major "rice bowls" here, and all the impacted organizations will fight it tooth and nail, but no fight is won that is not engaged.

Especially agree on the CT mission. You know my involvement there and I found we never truly had the time or capability to adequately address the issue in more than an in-extremis context. That was precisely why I moved us in the direction of conducting JCET's in countries where we might need to go to work someday. Our ability to establish relationships and gain local experience far outweighed what we lost in terms of working as a unit, in my opinion.

I especially liked the passage where you mentioned going back to the old SAS concept, which I have always felt made far more sense. Rotate battalions through the mission, thus allowing all units to gain weapons and tactical proficiency and thus raising the overall quality of the force.

One issue that has always troubled me however is how making us a branch has limited our ability to refresh the force on troop leading procedures and ground level, basic infantry realities in terms of leadership and training.

We cannot remove soldiers or leaders from the force who can no longer perform at an adequate level but can still function at levels acceptable in a conventional unit. This tends to force commanders to retain marginal performers, since the only option is fix or destroy.

I also would like to see us get back to a system that grows our officer corp in a manner that produces fully trained and experienced detachment commanders. Having a warrant as your XO is helpful in terms of helping a young detachment commander survive his first deployment while he gains experience, but a good team sergeant does the same thing. If we go to Majors for detachment commanders, why not go to Captains as XO's, so they can have an apprenticeship where they can learn the skills to lead effectively in a UO environment?

This would also give your officer corps more field leadership time in an operational environment, which is in my estimation never a bad thing. Nothing against the warrants, but I've always thought that for every sharp sergeant who went into the warrant program instead of OCS, we lost a great future battalion commander.

Good luck and I wish you success. I'm back in DC working with DOS, if there is anything I can do to further the cause, please don't hesitate to let me know.

V/R
Christopher Brewer

Thanks--An interesting read. I found the comments regarding "planting the 5th SFG flag over there" pretty compelling. I can certainly relate as I was a member of 3/7 SFG when we were yanked out of Panama following JUST CAUSE and sent back to CONUS (with plenty of work still to be done). I watched a Battalion that I loved steadily atrophy compared to its experience level in the late 80s. Back at Bragg people started worrying more about "speaking 5.56" vice Spanish and Portuguese. JRTC rotations began to count more on OERs than operational deployments to Colombia, Peru and El Salvador (where you could get shot with real 5.56 and 7.62). I'm not down-playing the shooting--I graduated SFARTAETC an thought it was some of the best training I got. I was also one of the last SF guys to go through DLI in Monterey and thought that too was a superior course (way beyond the Bragg course). I just don't see why out leaders (Bragg and Tampa based) can't get it through their head you have to be able to do both.

Another thing killing the "Groups" was the forced cross-fertilization of Field Grade Officers and Senior NCOs (usually imposed by someone who bounced around between Groups or served exclusively in a SMU). Continuous regional orientation allows you to get to know the "players" down-range and really understand the environment (everything-Political, Social, Geographic, etc...). As a personal example I worked with Hugo Chavez when he was a ABN Bn Cdr---I went back 10 years later on a disaster relief mission when he was President. It absolutely helped me, he recognized me and did not bust my balls like he was doing to every other guy that showed up from SOUTHCOM. That example is not isolated by any means---the other Groups have built lasting relations with Indonesia, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, etc..., etc... etc....

I want to personally congratulate whoever wrote the paper for highlighting the fact in a PUBLIC forum (not on the back deck of the GB Club) the fact that a SF guy's mission focus ought to be ISO the Combatant Commander not to somebody at Ft Bragg.

Good luck with this. I hope you guys can make some headway and get someone to listen because there is a better way to do business.

Bob

Let me add the following to my post:

I think my personal exception to deploying ODA/ODBs from one theater to another would involve teams supporting coalition warfare. An example cited in the in the SF Roles and Missions paper involved Haiti. I thought (and still do) that it made perfect sense to deploy an ODA to support the Guatemalan contingent. This facilitated coalition C4I and allowed an ODA to maintain a relationship with a regional unit supporting an out of theater requirement. I also think it makes sense to deploy 7th SFG ODAs to support the Salvadoran contingent in OIF. The short-term payoff is improved C4I for the coalition, while the long-term relationship in a combat zone with the Salvadorans will probably pay big dividends down the road in the USSOUTHCOM theater. I'm sure there are numerous examples involving the other groups.

~ On my birthday I don't think I needed to hear this again. Really, are these douche bags seriously thinking of such a merge?

I as well as an awful lot of friends, acquaintances, as well as some whom I really didn't give a flip for, spent many years forming what is now taken for granted as the best, most professional, and dedicated organization in the world, to have some glorified wannabe turn it into dysfunctional organization by attempting to create something else in their own feeble mind. I dare say we have numerous of our friends at the Big Ranch In The Sky, sipping a cold one with Maggie, Mrs "A" and the rest of the cast; discussing this situation with nary a smile on their faces. God rest their souls and God Bless the rest of us who may have to accept the changes, especially the Lads who are on the ground in this day and age battling the bad guys........Ringo

~ Yes. Blending of unit missions dilutes the special capabilities of each service. The USMC is very capable on seizing beachheads and close inland air heads. It will take years for MARSOC to gain any expertise in performing SF type missions and as I understand it, their people will be rotated out after 5 years. Keep hearing it takes about 8 years to train an SF Soldier. The Army can also do beach/air head missions, but again, why? Does this mean the Army should get high performance aircraft? Absolutely not. I'm cc-ing Larry B and Jack T. They may have some valuable input on this.

---Jack

MARSOC "training" appears to mimic the initial training that was developed by the original 10th SFGA back in 52-53. They appear to ignore the expertise of current SPECIAL FORCES which was obtained over the past 55 years of experience at all levels. As we all know (or should know) just being an Officer of increasing rank does not mean that a suitable command structure will follow. The same is true,but to a lesser extent of the Non-Commissioned Officer base. Admitidly the ranks of SPECIAL FORCES have not always exuded excellence, but the peer pressure more often than not prevented round pegs in square holes.

I would question that a force developed from asuch a small base(Current USMC strength levels where the majority of personnel are in the lower grades) can be successful over the short term. As the current GWOT won't last forever where will all these highly trained Marines go as the need for their services diminish? In the draw down from Vietnam SPECIAL FORCES provided the backbone of the many College ROTC units,Army and National Guard Advisors while many of the retirees took up positions as JROTC Instructors and advisors. Been there and saw it happen

Jim Bolan D95L

MARSOC is the end-game of the effort begun by GEN Al Gray when he was CG of FMFLANT back in the seventies, I think it was.

As long as MARSOC's mission is carefully circumscribed (to wit: providing close-in perimeter security in a hostage-barricade situation, etc.), there is no problem with their rotating out after five years, I suppose. That type of mission doesn't take eight years to train for.

To the extent that MARSOC degrades the awesome capability of the Corps to do what the Corps does best--kill the enemy--it is not a good idea. As long as enhances vice co-opts the true special operations missions as practiced by SF and SEALs, it may not be a bad idea. I'm waiting to see what they are used for.

Doctrinally,
Larry Bailey

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